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Since the 1990s, German soldiers have been continuously deployed abroad without 
geographical restrictions. This policy breaks with the customs of the Cold War, in which 
the Bundeswehr focused strictly on continental roles and missions of forward defense in 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The thesis argues that the evolution of the 
Bundeswehr to operational forces was a military adaptation determined by sociopolitical 
and military dynamics. Missions abroad transformed the Bundeswehr and had 
implications on the political level, and in society more broadly, in the face of domestic 
doubts and a public skepticism about war. 
More specifically, this transition has forced more qualitative changes than did 
unification and perhaps anything that came before. The heart and brains of the 
Bundeswehr changed because the Afghan mission was a new operational environment 
with unknown demands and consequences to which soldiers and civilians had to adapt in 
order to carry out the mission with success amid strategic ambiguity and domestic 
resistance. It resulted in a change of thinking, which has led to an emergence of a new 
identity of the Bundeswehr with a new Einsatz-Generation, which will have significant 
effects in Germany and among its allies well after the Germans cease security and combat 
operations in Afghanistan. 
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Five centuries ago, a political philosopher of state and armies, Niccolò 
Machiavelli, wrote in his book, History of Florence, that states “may go to war when they 
will, but cannot always withdraw when they like.”1 He further remarked that wars are 
unpredictable and have unforeseeable implications—intended and unintended—which for 
him begged the question of the ideal posture of military power in the state especially in 
view of the less effective soldiering done by mercenaries in the early modern period. 
A German soldier of today who wants to borrow something from the great spirit 
of Machiavelli for this moment will ask, as the great Florentine did in his own time, how 
contemporary military organizations fit the altered face of war, and how has the recent 
record of service and its fighting shed light on the character and essence of the German 
soldier and his or her army as it did in another epoch on the armies of Florence? In this 
connection, the role of the Afghan conflict, with the possible exception of the worsening 
crisis in Ukraine, is surely the most significant event in the contemporary history of the 
German military since German unity in 1990, if not earlier. It is a chapter in the evolution 
of armed forces that begs its full meaning as to the spirit of armies and their adjustment to 
contemporary conflict in its entire variety. Specifically, what changes has the prolonged 
engagement in Afghanistan brought to the Bundeswehr? 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
War since the late twentieth century, as well as operational and organizational 
changes in the German military, have had a long-term impact on the evolution of armed 
forces and raise important questions about the contemporary history of Germany’s 
military in NATO. Why and how have the Bundeswehr and German soldiering changed 
during the Afghan war in the dimensions of strategy, organization, and especially in 
institutions of command, obedience, and morale? What main contributing factors in 
1 Niccolò Machiavelli, History of Florence and of the Affairs of Italy: From the Earliest Times to the 
Death of Lorenzo the Magnificent (New York: M.W. Dunne, 1901), 118; Peter Paret, Gordon A. Craig and 
Felix Gilbert, Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1986). 
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politics, society, military organization, the battlefield, and allies account for the evolution 
of the Bundeswehr? Why and how did the Afghan war bring about a new identity of 
soldier and a new ethos of the Bundeswehr? How will the Bundeswehr evolve after the 
Germans cease security and combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014 and return to a 
state and society that has little appetite for conflict and to a Europe where the basis of 
peace is seriously eroding? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
The German military has evolved through a breakneck process of adaptation, 
force reduction, and new missions since 1990, which has often left the heads of soldiers 
and civilians spinning in an effort to adjust custom and practice to a new reality. This 
epoch began with the peaceful and even collegial roll-up of the Cold War German-
German military confrontation, the start of NATO enlargement, a significant reduction in 
the size of the Bundeswehr, and the advent of operations, however small, outside of 
Europe on a global scale. 
Since 1992, German soldiers have been deployed abroad without interruption. 
Today, some 5,700 members of the armed forces are stationed in Afghanistan, in Kosovo, 
in the Mediterranean, in Africa, and off the coast of Somalia.2 This policy and posture 
broke with the customs of the Cold War, when the Bundeswehr had been focused solely 
on continental roles and missions of forward defense in NATO. After the end of the Cold 
2 “Einsatzzahlen – Die Stärke der deutschen Einsatzkontingente,” Bundeswehr, updated on April 16, 
2014, http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/!ut/p/c4/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP3I5EyrpHK 
9pPKUVL3UzLzixNSSKiirpKoqMSMnNU-_INtREQD2RLYK/; Markus Kaim, Expanding ISAF – 
Ending OEF: The Debate on the Mandates Sending German Troops to Afghanistan (Berlin: German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2007); Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, German 
Special Operations Forces: The Case for Revision (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs, 2006); Philipp Münch, Strategielos in Afghanistan: Die Operationsführung der Bundeswehr im 
Rahmen der International Security Assistance Force (Berlin: German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs, 2011); Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, The German Army and Counterinsurgency in 
Afghanistan: The Need for Strategy (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2008); 
Markus Kaim and Pia Niedermeier, Zur Zukunft des deutschen ISAF-Einsatzes: Sicherheitspolitische 
Schlüsselfragen für die Londoner Afghanistan-Konferenz (Berlin: German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs, 2010).  
Note: Translations of all foreign titles cited are provided in the bibliography. Following the guidelines 
of the Chicago Manual of Style 16th Edition, the titles are translated freely by the author as a guide to the 
non-German-speaking reader; these translations should not be taken to bind a future publisher or formal 
translator. 
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War and German unification, the use of German soldiers in the international system 
changed fundamentally with the start of expeditionary operations in concert with 
international security organization.3  
This change was new for the German public, but it was not new for the German 
military, especially for those men and women of a new and significant generation who 
had served in the former Yugoslavia, in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and in the 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)—a NATO-led security mission—in 
Afghanistan.4 They had already served and fought for nine years in Afghanistan, and 
since 2001, the beginning of the Afghanistan conflict, the armed forces had begun to 
change—transform—its national security strategy, structure, organization, combat 
aircraft and vehicles, combat gear, military training, operational and tactical procedures, 
and most importantly, its identity. The heart and brains of the Bundeswehr, the soldiers, 
changed because the Afghan conflict was a new operational environment with unknown 
demands and consequences to which soldiers and civilians had to adapt to carry out this 
mission with success amid strategic ambiguity and domestic resistance. 
What gave rise to political debates in the early 1990s and in the beginning of the 
Afghan war in 2002 has become more typical, if not quite normal: the use of German 
military beyond territorial defense to enforce “peace and human rights, which are not just 
given but must be preserved and—where necessary—defended by force of arms; this is 
3 Rudolf J. Schlaffer, “Die Bundeswehr auf dem Weg zur Armee im Einsatz,” in Auslandseinsätze der 
Bundeswehr: Wegweiser zur Geschichte, ed. Bernhard Chiari and Magnus Pahl (Paderborn/Wien: 
Schöningh, 2010), 248, 255–7; Arne Freiherr von Neubeck, “Die Transformation der Bundeswehr von der 
Verteidigungs- zur Einsatzarmee: Eine sicherheitspolitische Analyse unter Brücksichtigung politischer, 
verfassungspolitischer und militärpolitischer Aspekte,” (dissertation, Julius-Maximilians-Universität, 
2007), 65–6. 
4 Bernhard Chiari and Magnus Pahl, Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: Wegweiser zur Geschichte 
(Paderborn/Wien: Schöningh, 2010), 13–4. 
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also duty of the Bundeswehr.”5 The variety of tasks of the German armed forces is 
manifold: ranging from the very first peace-keeping support in Cambodia, humanitarian 
aid in Somalia, peace-enforcing on the Balkans, especially in the Yugoslav successor 
states, and participating in global war against terrorism to multinational operations 
against piracy at the Horn of Africa. The evolution of the Bundeswehr and its adaptation 
to a new operational environment has nonetheless been undertaken in the face of deep 
domestic doubts about such operations, a public skepticism about war in general, and a 
lack of moral support for soldiers that contrasts starkly with the view of the armed forces 
in other leading Western democracies. 
The fraught nature of armed conflict in Germany manifests itself even in the 
words that German officials use—or do not use—in discussing these missions. In 2010, 
the former German Federal President, Horst Köhler, did not simply call the Afghan 
mission a “conflict”; he called it a new “war.”6 For the first time in German history since 
World War II, the German government spoke of war as something other than the total 
war or nuclear Armageddon on German soil. War as a political concept in the German 
political and strategic culture carries a very different meaning compared to the Anglo-
American world, with its less fateful record of war and soldiers. War is seen almost 
exclusively in personal (i.e., the portrait of Gerhard Schröder’s father in Stahlhelm and 
Feldbluse—a father whom the former chancellor never knew) and tragic terms, a 
generalized reaction to the militarism of the past and especially to the Nazi abuse of 
soldierly virtue and the glories of battle, which hold no allure in public life. 
5 Joachim Gauck, “Rede des Bundespräsidenten beim Feierlichen Gelöbnis für Soldatinnen und 
Soldaten der Bundeswehr am 20. Juli 2013,” Bundespräsidialamt, accessed on April 18, 2014, http://www. 
bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs/Reden/DE/Joachim-Gauck/Reden/2013/07/130720-Geloebnis-
Bundeswehr.html; Peter Schmidt, Das internationale Engagement in Afghanistan: Strategien, 
Perspektiven, Konsequenzen (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2008); Stefan 
Mair, Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: Leitfragen, Entscheidungsspielräume und Lehren (Berlin: 
German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2007); Andrea Schmitz, Beyond Afghanistan: The 
New ISAF Strategy: Implications for Central Asia (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs, 2010); Sascha Lange, Die Bundeswehr in Afghanistan: Personal und technische Ausstattung in der 
Einsatzrealität (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2008).  
6 “Auch Köhler spricht von Krieg in Afghanistan,” Focus, accessed on October 24, 2013, http://www. 
focus.de/politik/ausland/bundeswehr-auch-koehler-spricht-von-krieg-in-afghanistan_aid_511025.html; 
Sebastian Fischer and Veit Medick, “Bundeswehr in Afghanistan: Köhler entfacht neue Kriegsdebatte,” 
Spiegel, updated on May 27, 2010, http://www.spiegel.de/politik /deutschland/bundeswehr-in-afghanistan-
koehler-entfacht-neue-kriegsdebatte-a-696982.html. 
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In the years before 2010, the public and political notion of the Afghanistan 
mission began to change in terms of armed conflict toward war. Despite the unique 
features of military command and obedience, deaths of German soldiers were considered 
“casualties using the German word for killed by accident, rather than the word for a 
soldier fallen in the battle” until late 2008.7 During most of Minister of Defense Dr. 
Franz Josef Jung’s tenure, war-related words and signs in public communication were 
avoided and only the word Kampfeinsatz (combat mission) versus “war” was used to 
express the operational context of the German ISAF mission.8 German parliamentarians 
talked about combat missions, avoiding the notion of war.9  
In 2009, however, Dr. Jung struck a new path in the debate on war and fallen 
soldiers when he stressed his gratitude and appreciation for the dead soldiers who had 
fallen for Germany in efforts of peace at an official funeral service for two German 
soldiers who were killed by a suicide attack in Kunduz.10 His words seemed particularly 
charged. No German soldiers had been killed in action in more than sixty years, and the 
terms remained charged with their historical burden, associated with guilt. Gefallene 
(fallen) and its related term Krieg (war) also contrasted with the carefully cultivated 
picture of Bundeswehr’s Afghanistan mission being about stabilization or reconstruction 
rather than a warlike situation.11 Indeed, both terms––Krieg and Gefallene—are neither 
defined nor mentioned in the German military Law on the Legal Status of Soldiers.12 
With his choice of words, Dr. Jung’s funeral speech resulted not only from a broad 
debate within the Federal Ministry of Defense and within in the Bundestag but also 
7 David P. Auerswald and Stephen M. Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting 
Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), 145; Angelika Dörler-Dierken, “Identitätspolitik 
der Bundeswehr,” in Identität, Selbstverständnis, Berufsbild: Implikationen der neuen Einsatzrealität für 
die Bundeswehr, ed. Angelika Dörfler-Dierken and Gerhard Kümmel (Wiesbaden: Springer VS Verlag, 
2010), 138. 
8 Brehm et al., Armee im Einsatz, 164. 
9 Rid and Zapfe, “Mission Command without Mission,” 197. 
10 Dörler-Dierken, “Identitätspolitik der Bundeswehr,” 140; King, “Adaptation or Refusal to Adapt,” 
102. 
11 Rid and Zapfe, “Mission Command without Mission,” 197. 
12 Bundesministerium der Justiz, Gesetz über die Rechtsstellung der Soldaten (Berlin: 
Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2005), amended on May 30, 2005, http://www.gesetze-im-Internet. 
de/bundesrecht/sg/gesamt.pdf. 
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emerged from the extensive amendment of Innere Führung that was altered to suit the 
new military experiences including the necessity to fight. 
In other words, the transformation due to the Afghan conflict has forced more 
qualitative changes of the German armed forces than unification or, perhaps, any 
development before it. Such adaptions of service and purpose as well as fighting power 
were undertaken significantly enough, while German troops were under fire in 
Afghanistan. This present work and its inquiry into contemporary war and changes of the 
German military will promote a better understanding of the Afghan war and its 
consequences for the German contemporary military in particular. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
“War is a mere continuation of politics by other means,” goes a well-known 
statement from the Prussian officer and military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, who 
elaborated on the political and moral aspects of war in his prominent work Vom Kriege.13 
It is certainly the common perception across the world that the instrument to conduct war 
is the military. In this context, war means violent acts against enemies to overwhelm their 
will.14 To fulfill this purpose, military organizations must have the willingness to go to 
extremes.15 Thus, members of the military organizations––soldiers––have to be prepared 
and trained to execute that will, in case of the need to kill others or to risk their life.16 
This functional description is the unique attribute that separates the military profession 
from most others. However, such a professional code collides with the convictions of 
many civilians and others who regard any state use of violence in any form as a 
monstrosity. The stance is particularly pronounced in Germany today.  
13 Carl von Clausewitz, Vom Kriege, ed. A.W. Bode (Dortmund: Vergangenheitsverlag, 2011), 81, 
iBooks, https://itun.es/us/mU23y.l. 
14 Ibid., 50. 
15 Ibid., 56. 
16 Jens Warburg, “Paradoxe Anforderungen an Soldaten im (Kriegs-)Einsatz,” in Identität, 
Selbstverständnis, Berufsbild: Implikationen der neuen Einsatzrealität für die Bundeswehr, ed. Dörfler-
Dierken, Angelika and Gerhard Kümmel (Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag, 2010), 58. 
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Politics and military organizations have an interlocking relationship with each 
other; politics determine the institutional and organizational nature of the military: ideals 
of command and leadership, quality and quantity, and their responsibilities combined 
with political and strategic goals for military operations. Politics define the guidelines 
and set the parameters for military organizations in a hierarchical, top-down procedure. 
Military organizations must meet the requirements and fulfill the purpose of the political 
interest. Because German “security is not defined in geographical terms only,” there are 
basically no geographical restrictions on German military deployment.17 As the late Dr. 
Peter Struck noted, the security of Germany is “also defended in the Hindu Kush.”18 
The Federal Republic of Germany is, after the United States and United Kingdom, 
currently third on the list of contributors of deployed soldiers abroad. Since 1992, the 
intensity and the extent of these military missions have grown, which resulted in 103 
German soldiers killed in action, 55 of them in the Afghan war.19 The increasing demand 
on military capabilities changed the German military that fights wars—and the way the 
armed forces, the politicians, and the public view the fighting forces and their missions.  
A closer analysis of the Afghan war reveals that public and political perceptions 
diverge from the reality that confronts the military. Consequently, in a process of steps 
since 1989, the armed forces not only created a new set of strategic policy papers 
emphasizing the importance of military missions abroad but also inherently adapted 
ethos, organization, and command to their nature amid the new operational demands.20 
Thus, the evolution of the Bundeswehr cannot only be seen as a top-down procedure 
initiated by German politics. The altered military missions that intensified apace meant 
17 Federal Ministry of Defense, Defense Policy Guidelines: Safeguarding National Interests – 
Assuming International Responsibility – Shaping Security Together (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 
2011), 1. 
18 Anthony King, The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces: From the Rhine to Afghanistan 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 4. 
19 “Todesfälle bei Bundeswehrangehörigen im Einsatz nach Einsatzgebiet von 1992 bis 2013,” 
Statista, accessed on October 25, 2013, http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/193958/umfrage 
/todesfaelle-bei-bundeswehrangehoerigen-im-einsatz-nach-einsatzgebiet/. 
20 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Vom Einsatz her denken. Konzentration, Flexibilität, 
Effizienz, Bericht der Strukturkommission der Bundeswehr (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 
2010). 
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new experiences and new perceptions: peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, Somalia 
and the Adriatic in 1992, in Bosnia, 1995, as well as in Kosovo, 1999, and, most 
fatefully, the security-building and warfare in Afghanistan since 2001. These military 
missions at Europe’s periphery had implications on the political level as concerns foreign 
and security policy as well as the role of the forces in society. Hence, analyzing the 
evolution of the Bundeswehr only through, say, a collection of security policy statements 
and proclamations of ministers and chiefs of defense does not show the full process of 
adaptation to the new set of demands, nor does it encompass the extent of the changes of 
the German military.  
In contrast, the consideration, especially by an officer with operational experience 
of a bottom-up process of change, reveals what the transition meant for the soldiers’ 
alternating operational demands and how it, in turn, resulted in a change of thinking, 
which has led to an emergence of a new identity of the Bundeswehr.21 The 2008 
modifications of Innere Führung, which institutionalizes the core concepts of command 
and leadership of the Bundeswehr, underscores this change of mind that can be 
interpreted with the concept of a miles protector or a miles bellicus.22 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The present thesis relies on existing scholarly literature of political and social 
sciences and of contemporary history. The repertoire of scholarly work with a focus on 
German military reforms as well as on German security and defense politics—especially 
after unification in 1990—is manifold and demands a closer analysis. Publications from 
the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, the Institute for Military 
History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr, and the Federal Agency for Civic 
Education provide a broader body of scholarly works that address the development of the 
armed forces against the background of German military deployments. Additionally, 
21 Walter Dorn and Michael Varey, “The Rise and Demise of the ‘Three Block War,’” Canadian 
Military Journal 10, no. 1 (2009): 38; Simon Cocksedge, “The Three-block War and Future Conflict, Some 
Implications for the Rifle Platoon,” Australian Army Journal 3, no. 1 (2005): 267‒271. 
22 Elmar Wiesendahl, “Zurück zum Krieger? Soldatische Berufsleitbilder der Bundeswehr zwischen 
Athen und Sparta,” in Soldaten im Einsatz: Sozialwissenschaftliche und ethische Reflexionen, ed. Stefan 
Bayer and Matthias Gillner (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2011): 242‒248. 
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policy papers of the Federal Government, of the Lower House of German Parliament 
(Bundestag), and of the Federal Minister of Defense are open sources and broaden the 
available scholarly literature on this topic significantly. 
The German Institute for International and Security Affairs, along with the 
Institute for Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr, provides essential 
and significant academic literature for this thesis about modern war and changes of the 
Bundeswehr. The German Institute for International and Security Affairs possesses a 
plethora of academic literature focusing on the evolution of the German military since 
World War II up to current military deployments. Their essays illustrate the course of 
German deployments starting in Morocco in 1960, and discuss policies, military 
operations, and the causes of their success or failure.23 The essays provide a broad 
understanding that the armed forces had to adapt to a new set of demands.24 International 
constraints as well as operational and functional demands led the German military to alter 
their structure, organization, military training, and purpose, which resulted in challenging 
the ideals of command and leadership. This rethinking and its discussion are not new in 
contemporary German military history; for instance, the Karst-Baudissin controversy of 
the 1960s touched off a similar re-examination (see Chapter II).25 New essays picked up 
that old discussion and demanded a rethinking of the German military ideals underlining 
their argument on the emergence of a new Bundeswehr that must be mobile, flexible, and 
23 Chiari and Pahl, Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr, 25. 
24 Peter Schmidt, Das internationale Engagement in Afghanistan: Strategien, Perspektiven, 
Konsequenzen (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2008); Stefan Mair, 
Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: Leitfragen, Entscheidungsspielräume und Lehren (Berlin: German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2007); Andrea Schmitz, Beyond Afghanistan: The New 
ISAF Strategy: Implications for Central Asia (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs, 2010); Sascha Lange, Die Bundeswehr in Afghanistan: Personal und technische Ausstattung in der 
Einsatzrealität (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2008); Markus Kaim, 
Expanding ISAF – Ending OEF: The Debate on the Mandates Sending German Troops to Afghanistan 
(Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2007); Timo Noetzel and Benjamin 
Schreer, German Special Operations Forces: The Case for Revision (Berlin: German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs, 2006); Philipp Münch, Strategielos in Afghanistan: Die 
Operationsführung der Bundeswehr im Rahmen der International Security Assistance Force (Berlin: 
German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2011); Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, The 
German Army and Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: The Need for Strategy (Berlin: German Institute for 
International and Security Affairs, 2008); Markus Kaim and Pia Niedermeier, Zur Zukunft des deutschen 
ISAF-Einsatzes: Sicherheitspolitische Schlüsselfragen für die Londoner Afghanistan-Konferenz (Berlin: 
German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2010). 
25 “Innere Führung: Grasheys Nachbrenner,” in Der Spiegel 19 (1969): 30‒32. 
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interoperable with allied partners to conduct military operations—war—without 
geographical restrictions.26 This point of view gives up on the idea of the citizen in 
uniform—the key ideal of Innere Führung—and emphasizes military professionalism 
with its single focus on fighting wars.  
The German military, however, did not change because of a debate about 
command and leadership but due to German politics in general and to the operational 
environment in particular. Starting with out-of-area missions in the 1990s, different 
environments ranging from humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and enforcing 
operations to high-intensity warfare changed “postwar Germany’s reluctant armed 
forces,” prompting them to build up military expertise and to gain international 
confidence.27 
The Institute for Military History and Social Sciences of the Bundeswehr, which 
is an institute under the chain of command of the German Armed Forces Office, focuses 
on military topics of contemporary German history studies. The institute published 
several social science journals that addressed the development of the German military 
and the emergence of operations of the armed forces engaging terrorist threats abroad, 
and, furthermore, the challenges to Innere Führung and also problems and strain, which 
soldiers are confronted with during their deployment.28 Most articles do not concentrate 
findings on military issues only but incorporate research from public opinion surveys on 
security and defense issues as well. 
26 Hans-Joachim Reeb, “Die ‘neue’ Bundeswehr,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 48 (2009): 17‒22; 
Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “Innere Führung und der Wandel des Kriegsbildes,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 48 
(2009): 23‒29. 
27 Christopher Alessi, “Learning to Fight: How Afghanistan Changed the German Military,” Spiegel, 
updated on October 15, 2013, http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/how-afghanistan-has-changed-
the-bundeswehr-german-military-a-927891.html. 
28 Stefan Bayer and Matthias Gillner, Soldaten im Einsatz: Sozialwissenschaftliche und ethische 
Reflexionen (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2011); Angelika Dörfler-Dierken and Gerhard Kümmel 
Identität, Selbstverständnis, Berufsbild: Implikationen der neuen Einsatzrealität für die Bundeswehr 
(Wiesbaden: Springer VS Verlag, 2010); Sabine Jaberg, Heiko Biehl, Günter Mohrmann and Maren 
Tomforde, Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: Sozialwissenschaftliche Analysen, Diagnosen und 
Perspektiven (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2009); Carsten Pietsch, Anja Seiffert and Phil C. Langer, Der 
Einsatz der Bundeswehr in Afghanistan: Sozial- und politikwissenschaftliche Perspektiven (Wiesbaden: 
Springer VS Verlag, 2012); Ulrich vom Hagen, Armee in der Demokratie: Zum Verhältnis von zivilen und 
militärischen Prinzipien: Zum Spannungsverhältnis von zivilen und militärischen Prinzipien (Wiesbaden: 
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2006). 
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The essays of the social science journals can be categorized into different fields of 
interest, each focusing on specific challenges due to military operations. The emergence 
of new ideals of command, leadership, and military profession is addressed by, among 
others, Elmar Wiesendahl, former Head of Department of the German General Staff 
College. Critical essays raise questions about whether the ongoing transformation of the 
German military requires a new corporate philosophy, which may or may not be 
consistent with Innere Führung.29 The discussion emphasizes the importance of identity, 
professionalized self-image, and their relationship with the military profession in general 
as well as for the Bundeswehr in particular. Jens Warburg and Maja Apelt, who address 
the development of new military operations and their meaning for military 
professionalism, complement the discussion about the role of soldiers and the 
applicability of Innere Führung abroad. Their essays, among others, illustrate the 
growing challenges—”paradoxical requirements”—of military operations ranging from 
“feeding and clothing displaced refugees—providing humanitarian assistance [… and] 
holding two warring tribes apart—conducting peacekeeping operations, [… to] fighting a 
highly lethal mid-intensity battle. All on the same day, all within three city blocks. It will 
be what we call the three-block war.”30 These paradoxical requirements demand a new 
set of skills. The changing military operations, in particular the Afghan war, were new, 
unknown operational environments with broader demands and consequences.  
On military professionalism, the academic literature points out that cross-cultural 
competence is one key necessity to carry out missions successfully. Maren Tomforde and 
Phil C. Langer emphasize the necessity of cross-cultural competence, which is a 
prerequisite for the “relationship to local civilians built on communication and 




30 Jens Warburg, “Paradoxe Anforderungen an Soldaten im (Kriegs-)Einsatz,” in Identität, 
Selbstverständnis, Berufsbild: Implikationen der neuen Einsatzrealität für die Bundeswehr, ed. Dörfler-
Dierken, Angelika and Gerhard Kümmel (Wiesbaden: Springer VS Verlag, 2010); Maja Apelt, “Die 
Paradoxien des Soldatenberufs im Spiegel des soldatischen Selbstkonzeptes,” in Auslandseinsätze der 
Bundeswehr: Sozialwissenschaftliche Analysen, Diagnosen und Perspektiven, ed. Jaberg, Sabine, Heiko 
Biehl, Günter Mohrmann and Maren Tomforde (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2009); Cocksedge, “The 
Three-block War and Future Conflict,” 267–71. 
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confidence,”31 across all hierarchic levels of the chain of command because operating 
“without cultural understanding is to operate blind and deaf.”32 To deploy soldiers abroad 
requires taking into account cultural differences not only in political terms (the strategic 
level) but also in the military realm (the tactical level): a consequence of the Afghan war 
that had to be adapted for and incorporated into strategic policies and for the ideals of 
command and leadership of the German military. 
The Federal Agency for Civic Education offers a diversity of academic literature 
focusing on the development of the German military, the Afghan war, and about 
Afghanistan.33 The literature elaborates on failures of German politics and international 
strategies, on escapist political and military decisions, and on challenges that arose 
because the Hindu Kush might not be understood in Western terms of rationality or 
thought.34 According to Klaus Naumann, political and military failures occurred already 
at the beginning of the Afghan military endeavor, in 2001, when politicians decided to 
use a two-way approach to build up democracy in Afghanistan: OEF on the one hand and 
ISAF on the other—two inherently diametrical operations. The literature shows 
politicians, who are unwilling to take responsibility for intensifying military operations in 
Afghanistan, and the German military, which is confronted with the reality of war and is 
forced to adapt to it accordingly, resulting in a rushed evolution of the German military 
from the bottom. 
31 Maren Tomforde, “‘Bereit für drei Tassen Tee?’ Die Rolle von Kultur für Auslandseinsätze der 
Bundeswehr,” in Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: Sozialwissenschaftliche Analysen, Diagnosen und 
Perspektiven, ed. Jaberg, Sabine, Heiko Biehl, Günter Mohrmann and Maren Tomforde (Berlin: Duncker 
and Humblot, 2009), 85. 
32 The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Joint Doctrine Note 1/09: The Significance of 
Culture to the Military (Swindon: Ministry of Defense, 2009), 1. 
33 Susanne Koelbl and Olaf Ihlau, Geliebtes, dunkles Land: Menschen und Mächte in Afghanistan 
(Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2008); Naumann, Klaus, Einsatz ohne Ziel? Die 
Politikbedürftigkeit des Militärischen (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2010); Ahmed Rashid, 
Am Abgrund: Afghanistan, Pakistan und der Westen (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2013); 
Franziska Storz, Marc Baumann, Martin Langeder, Mauritius Much, and Bastian Obermayer, Feldpost: 
Briefe deutscher Soldaten aus Afghanistan (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 2011); Andreas 
Timmermann-Levanas, and Andrea Richter, Die reden – Wir sterben (Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische 
Bildung, 2010). 
34 Koelbl, Geliebtes, dunkles Land, 10. 
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Additionally, policy papers of the Federal Government, of the Bundestag, and of 
the Federal Ministry of Defense broaden the findings of the aforementioned scholarly 
literature. The different sources illustrate German politics in respect to strategic interests 
influencing the development of the armed forces and deciding to use armed forces 
abroad. Since unification, Germany’s participation in military operations alongside its 
allied partners has increased significantly. A closer look at the German White Papers 
1994 and 2006 published by the Federal Government and at the Defense Policy 
Guidelines from 1992, 2003, and 2011 by the Federal Ministry of Defense reveal a 
change in German politics.35 The White Paper 2006 emphasizes, as before, the dynamics 
of a constantly changing picture of international conflict and war. Thus, the armed forces 
must obtain a high degree of flexibility and adaptability to cope with new operational 
environments abroad. According to the current defense policy, the German military 
focuses no longer on territorial defense because of the unlikelihood of conventional 
aggression. Their main purpose covers international crisis prevention, including the fight 
against terrorism.  
To implement this defense reorientation, both governmental sources argued to 
transform the former forward defense force into a modern crisis intervention force. This 
new idea of the Bundeswehr was already expressed in 1995 when the Bundestag passed a 
law stating that the Bundestag must decide on all German military missions.36 The 
adaptation of German law was a first political step that not only established the 
requirements to guarantee future participation of German military abroad but also 
confirmed the special responsibility of German politics for military operations. 
35 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Weißbuch 2006 zur Sicherheitspolitik Deutschlands und zur 
Zukunft der Bundeswehr (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2006), accessed on February 6, 
2014, http://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzMyMmUzMTM1MzMyZTM2 
MzEzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY3NmE2ODY1NmQ2NzY4MzEyMDIwMjAyMDIw/WB_2006_dt
_mB.pdf; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien für den 
Geschäftsbereich des Bundesministers der Verteidigung (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 
2003), accessed on February 6, 2014, http://www.bmvg.de/resource/resource/MzEzNTM4MmUzMzM 
yMmUzMTM1MzMyZTM2MzEzMDMwMzAzMDMwMzAzMDY3NmY2ODMyNzU3OTY4NjIyMDI
wMjAyMDIw/Verteidigungspolitische%20Richtlinien%20(27.05.11).pdf. 
36 Bundesministerium der Justiz, Gesetz über die parlamentarische Beteiligung bei der Entscheidung 
über den Einsatz bewaffneter Streitkräfte im Ausland (Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz) (Berlin: 
Bundesministerium der Justiz, 2005), accessed on October 27, 2013, http://www.gesetze-im-Internet. 
de/bundesrecht/parlbg/gesamt.pdf. 
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These governmental sources present the same causal argumentation to modernize 
and to adapt the armed forces to the most likely art of modern conflict and war. These 
coherent policies seemed to fade in the course of events in alternating military operations 
and intensifying warfare during the Afghan war. While the security situation in 
Afghanistan declined after 2003 continuously, several letters of inquiry of the Bundestag 
criticized the Federal Government and questioned the coherent, transparent policies of 
German military actions.37 
In light of the extensive use of foreign literature in the present work, the author 
has provided unofficial translations of all foreign titles cited in the bibliography. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The main contributing factors to the evolution of Bundeswehr include German 
politics, the character of German and international military institutions, and the course of 
events during military operations. The former issue includes changes in German politics 
after unification in 1990 and the gradual acclimatization of the public to support an 
expanding international responsibility with military means. The latter issue includes the 
development of the Bundeswehr in the face of different military operations that started 
with providing humanitarian aid and intensified with each following military 
intervention, to the point of highly lethal warfare in Afghanistan. Taking the Afghan war 
as the focus of this analytical framework, the changes of German politics and 
development of the armed forces will be discussed in detail: 
37 Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage der Abgeordneten Birgit Homburger et al. und der Fraktion 
der FDP, “Die Bundeswehr - eine aufgabenorientierte Streitkraft?” Drucksache 16/9962, Deutscher 
Bundestag (Köln: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009); Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der 
Abgeordneten und der Fraktion DIE LINKE, “Aufgabe und Bedeutung der Quick Reaction Force für die 
Einsatzstrategie der ISAF und die Implikationen für den Bundeswehreinsatz in Afghanistan,” Drucksache 
16/7923, Deutscher Bundestag (Köln: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2008); Bundesregierung auf die 
Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, “Bundeswehreinsatz 
und Ausbildung im Afghanistan-Konzept der Bundesregierung,” Drucksache 17/724, Deutscher Bundestag 
(Köln: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2010); Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der 
Abgeordneten und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN, “Militärischer Kurswechsel in Afghanistan 
– Fragen zu den geplanten Änderungen des Beitrags der Bundeswehr,” Drucksache 16/8144, Deutscher 
Bundestag (Köln: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2008); Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der 
Abgeordneten und der Fraktion der FDP, “Übernahme der Aufgaben der Quick Reaction Force (Schnelle 
Eingreiftruppe) im Norden Afghanistans durch die Bundeswehr,” Drucksache 16/8101, Deutscher 
Bundestag (Köln: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2008). 
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• Why and how have the Bundeswehr and German soldiering changed 
during the Afghan war? 
• What main contributing factors in state, society, the armed forces, 
international organizations and elsewhere have accounted for the evolution 
of the Bundeswehr? 
• Why and how did the Afghan war result in the emergence of a new 
military as well as civil military identity of the Bundeswehr? 
• What impact will the evolution of the Bundeswehr have after the Germans 
cease security and combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014?  
These research questions are answered in single case studies of contemporary 
German history starting after the unification in 1990, but emphasizing the Afghan war 
from 2001 until 2014. Figure 1 presents a timeline against the background of alternating 
chancellorship with each corresponding minister of defense at different phases of the 
Afghan conflict. 
 
Figure 1.  Phases of the Afghan conflict. 
Different chancellorships and ministers of defense followed distinct strategies that 
influenced the evolution of the German military directly. The reality of conflict and war 
did not coherently reflect Berlin’s political ideas and strategies. Based on governmental 
sources and academic literature, this thesis describes in a chronological sequence the 
course of events in Afghanistan and the consequential development of the armed forces 
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while taking the different domestic legislative and cabinet periods with their different 
security and defense policies into account. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The thesis consists of six chapters. After this introduction, Chapter II addresses 
early changes of the German military, including the classic Cold War debate between 
Heinz Karst and Wolf Graf von Baudissin about the role of the soldier and combat in it. 
Then, Chapter III presents the security and defense policies of Dr. Peter Struck, 
illustrating the initial setup of OEF and ISAF. Chapter IV illustrates the transition from 
Dr. Struck to Dr. Jung and the subsequent transition to Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg 
discussing the challenges and constraints for the expansion of the ISAF mandate beyond 
Kabul. The political transition from zu Guttenberg to Dr. Thomas de Maizière as well as 
the subsequent transition to Dr. Ursula von der Leyen will be part of Chapter V, which 
emphasizes the need for a strategy change in the face of intensified combat, military 
adaptation of the Bundeswehr, and Berlin’s debates on Krieg and Gefallene. The last 
chapter addresses the evolution of the Bundeswehr to operational forces and picks up the 
social, political, and military challenges and opportunities of a modern military in a free, 
safe, and democratic nation. 
The thesis concludes by illustrating the course of events in the Afghan conflict, 
which ultimately emerged in German domestic politics and perceptions as a war. These 
chapters trace the story of the change in the spirit and service of the German soldier in the 
stress of conflict and domestic politics as well as the political culture that assigns little 
merit to fighting. This transition meant alternating operational demands for the soldiers, 
and it resulted in a change of thinking, which has led to a new identity of the 
Bundeswehr, which will surely have a significant effect well after the Germans cease 
security and combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014. 
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II. THE KARST–BAUDISSIN CONTROVERSY: MILITARY 
PROFESSIONALISM 
As Wolf Graf von Baudissin argued, “soldiers are like children of their time;”38 
neither the image of German soldiers nor Innere Führung was understood to be 
inviolably set in stone and unalterable. The early debate between the founding fathers of 
Innere Führung, Brigadier General Heinz Karst and Lieutenant General Wolf Graf von 
Baudissin, continues to reverberate in the question of whether democracy or military 
effectiveness should have a higher value in the German armed forces.39  
Innere Führung addresses this question because it “defines the concept of 
leadership development and civic education” within the Bundeswehr and fuses the basic 
principles “of the self-image of soldiers” in the German democratic society with the duty 
to preserve the law and military discipline.40 As the historical, political, and social 
context changes with the society and international relations, the soldiers and the military 
forces with their strategies and doctrines adapt accordingly. Hence, Innere Führung is a 
dynamic concept that has to deal with these domestic and international changes to face 
present-day internal as well as external political events, challenges, and threats. While it 
was adapted to the context and challenges of the time in 1972 during the administration 
of Minister of Defense Helmut Schmidt, in 1993 on behalf of Minister of Defense Volker 
Rühe, and in 2008 amended during the term of office of Minister of Defense Dr. Jung, it 
38 Wolfgang Schneiderhahn, “Das Bild des Offiziers im 21. Jahrhundert,” in Soldaten im Einsatz: 
Sozialwissenschaftliche und ethische Reflexionen, ed. Stefan Bayer and Matthias Gillner (Berlin: Duncker 
und Humblot, 2011), 211. 
39 Jürgen Groß, “‘Innere Führung’ – Was ist das eigentlich?,” in Zurückgestutzt, sinnentleert, 
unverstanden: Die Innere Führung der Bundeswehr, ed. Detlef Bald, Hans-Günter Fröhling, Jürgen Groß 
and Claus Freiherr von Rosen (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2008), 10. 
40 Federal Ministry of Defense, Joint Service Regulation 10/1: Innere Führung (Leadership 
Development and Civic Education) (Bonn: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2008), accessed on March 




                                                 
never lost sight of the fundamentals of the German military based on the “guiding 
principle of the ‘citizen in uniform.’”41 
A. INNERE FÜHRUNG: GERMAN MILITARY PROFESSIONALISM 
Because the armed forces were considered to be a state within a state during the 
Weimar Republic and the Wehrmacht was deemed criminal for the atrocities of World 
War II during the Nazi regime, the establishment of the Bundeswehr and its relationship 
between the state and society had to be entirely reorganized. After 1949, West German 
statesmen were confronted with the necessity to match the newly formed Bundeswehr 
closely to society as well as to the new political system.42 
The foundation of the Bundeswehr and Germany’s rearmament were laid with the 
Himmeroder Denkschrift (Himmerod Memorandum) in October 1950 that set the external 
organizational conditions (i.e., structure and number of soldiers). The document also 
provides the earliest call for refounding the German armed forces on a very different 
internal basis—the forerunner of Innere Führung. Since its first mention in 1953, Innere 
Führung has been understood as the guideline that determines the internal organizational 
conditions such as the leadership, civic education of the people, and thus, the prerequisite 
for the interaction between the people; meaning how soldiers––and citizens—work 
together and respect another.  
Four core aspects of Innere Führung are key and unchanged constructs: 
legitimation, integration, motivation, and the design of the internal order. First, 
legitimation demands that German soldiers know at all times why they serve Germany 
and what legal, political, and ethical standards must be followed. Second, integration 
rests on the main principle of Innere Führung: citizen in uniform.43 The focus has always 
41 Franz Josef Jung, “Tagesbefehl des Bundesministers der Verteidigung, Bonn, 28. Januar 2008,” in 
ZDv 10/1 Innere Führung: Selbstverständnis und Führungskultur der Bundeswehr, ed. Bundesministerium 
der Verteidigung (Bonn: Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, 2008); Bundesministerium der 
Verteidigung, Joint Service Regulation 10/1: Innere Führung, 2. 
42 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Innere Führung, Nr. 201–5; Donald Abenheim, Bundeswehr 
und Tradition: Die Suche nach dem gültigen Erbe des deutschen Soldaten (München: Oldenbourg 
Wissenschaftsverlag, 1989), vii. 
43 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Innere Führung, Nr. 105. 
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been on the integration of the Bundeswehr into the German state and its society.44 
Soldiers promote the public’s understanding of the need for Bundeswehr missions; they 
simultaneously remain an active part of the society. Only those people who experience 
the fundamental rights of the Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (the 
German constitution or Basic Law) themselves, appreciate and also defend them. Third, 
motivation is necessary to push the soldiers’ maximum commitment to the mission’s 
purpose and its success. Finally, the design of the internal order emphasizes the balance 
between the performance of military professionalism and the preservation of human 
dignity and rule of law at all times.45 Despite several military adaptations to 
accommodate changing operational environments and their demands, these core 
principles were never revisited and remain now almost instinctive conventions of Innere 
Führung.  
At the same time, Innere Führung––almost sixty years old––is no rigid concept. 
Different methods and approaches to the implementation of this Joint Service Regulation 
have been assessed and developed in the intervening years.46 Three tasks of Innere 
Führung—leadership, civic education, and legal and military discipline—were especially 
important because superior officers had to bear the special responsibility for these three 
tasks. Thus, the key message and also the touchstone for superiors are: “Humans who 
want to command other human beings have to like them first.”47 Innere Führung sees 
Auftragstaktik (mission order) as the paramount command concept that enables 
operational freedom for and participation of subordinates to achieve mission success.48  
  
44 Abenheim, Bundeswehr und Tradition, 31. 
45 Groß, “‘Innere Führung,” 7‒8. 
46 Hans-Günter Fröhling, “Die Sicherheit Deutschlands wird auch am Hindukusch verteidigt! – 
Brauchen wir eine neue Innere Führung?” in Zurückgestutzt, sinnentleert, unverstanden: Die Innere 
Führung der Bundeswehr ed. Detlef Bald, Hans-Günter Fröhling, Jürgen Groß, and Claus Freiherr von 
Rosen (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2008), 125. 
47 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Innere Führung, Nr. 607. 
48 Ibid., Nr. 604–24. 
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Additionally, Innere Führung equally addresses the daily contact between soldiers 
and citizens next to “injury and death, dealing with anxiety or with questions of guilt and 
failure.”49 Further political education in law and military discipline illustrate the 
legitimation of the tasks of the Bundeswehr against the background of ethical and legal 
standards. As a former commander of the Führungsakademie der Bundeswehr (German 
General Staff College) argued, “Innere Führung is not a simple supplement for 
commanding troops. The Joint Service Regulation permeates the entire military service in 
time of peace and war. It is a profoundly political, social, and military concept, no intra-
military doctrine.”50 
Innere Führung has become a fixture in the German military mind and practice. It 
has, however, never curtailed debates about the contents and scope of the Joint Service 
Regulation between the so-called traditionalists (including Heinz Karst) and reformers 
(including Wolf Graf von Baudissin). What is the proper focus of the fighting man and 
woman in Germany? Soldiers as fighters or as guarantors of peace through deterrence?  
B. KARST: SOLDIERS FOR COMBAT 
Wherever in the war, grenadiers on grenadiers, tank on tank, plane on 
plane, warship on warship, in short, soldiers face soldiers, an unwavering 
will has to animate them: to defeat the enemy.51 
–Brigadier General Heinz Karst 
Heinz Karst––one of the most important representatives of the traditionalists 
among the founding fathers of Innere Führung––viewed soldiers as fighters first and 
foremost. Therefore, “the main purpose of an army to be a powerful instrument of 
49 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Innere Führung, Nr. 609. 
50 Hans-Christian Beck and Christian Singer, “Innere Führung als wesentliche Aufgabe der 
militärischen Führung und des Primates der Politik,” in Jahrbuch Innere Führung 2012: Der Soldatenberuf 
im Spagat zwischen gesellschaftlicher Integration und sui generis-Ansprüchen. Gedanken zur 
Weiterentwicklung der Inneren Führung, ed. Uwe Hartmann, Claus von Rosen and Christian Walther 
(Berlin: Miles Verlag, 2012), 31. 
51 Quotation translated by the author; Heinz Karst, Das Bild des Soldaten: Versuch eines Umrisses 
(Boppard am Rhein: Harald Boldt, 1964), 13.  
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politics” was brought to the fore.52 Although Karst emphasized that a powerful West 
German army could contribute through deterrence to peace, the soldiers were the focus 
because they only achieved a deterrent effect if they fulfilled their core mission: fighting 
with all their strength. Hence, the task of preventing war was not part of the military 
realm but clearly part of the political responsibility.53 As Karst argued, “the soldier’s 
only job is to win a possible war. [… ] The better he guarantees to succeed, the more 
likely the peace is secured.”54 This thought was an essential element of Karst’s argument, 
which he underlined with several examples. For instance, he discussed the armed 
conflicts in the 1960s and confronted his audience with questions on why American 
soldiers in Vietnam or Israeli soldiers in the Arab-Israeli War could be motivated to fight 
if––with respect to Baudissin––soldiers’ genuine goal was assumingly to keep peace.55 
Karst’s arguments on Innere Führung and on the image of the Bundeswehr in 
German society pointed out the ability to fight as the primary purpose of the armed 
forces. At the same time, he addressed secondary tasks, which also have to be fulfilled by 
the armed forces. For example, he frequently mentioned aspects of civic education as 
another task. Although he highlighted this as an important task, he strongly criticized 
both politics and society for the public’s lack of understanding of military dynamics and, 
thus, made the civic educational task necessary and part of Bundeswehr’s mission 
consequently. Metaphorically, Karst presented the image of employers and employees 
and complained that it must not be the task of the Bundeswehr––employees––to explain 
the society––employer––why modern states establish armed forces for defense and for its 
populace.56  
52 Heinz Karst, “Soldat im Ghetto? Bedenken über die innenpolitische Entwicklung der 
Vorbereitungen für den Aufbau der Streitkräfte,” in Im Dienst am Vaterland: Beiträge aus vier 
Jahrzehnten, ed. Klaus Hornung and Heinz Karst (Hamburg: Busse Seewald, 1994), 13. 
53 Karst, Bild des Soldaten, 359‒60 
54 Ibid., 14. 
55 Heinz Karst, “Die verkannte Armee: Über das Verhältnis von Primärzweck und Sekundäraufgaben 
der Bundeswehr,” in Im Dienst am Vaterland: Beiträge aus vier Jahrzehnten, ed. Klaus Hornung and Heinz 
Karst (Hamburg: Busse Seewald, 1994), 40. 
56 Karst, Bild des Soldaten, 11. 
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According to Karst, the German people and the politicians––as the representation 
of the people––missed the basic understanding of defense. In particular, he criticized the 
recurring fear of politics and society regarding a state within a state, as was the case with 
the military in the Weimar Republic. Thus, he strongly supported the integration of the 
armed forces into the society, but he equally highlighted the importance and meaning of 
Article 87a of the German constitution.57 Hence, Karst argued for the purposes of 
defense rather than integration at the center of thinking that should prevail in the military, 
social, and political realm.58 Thus, Karst’s criticism of Innere Führung can be reduced to 
two main points. First, Innere Führung did not only presume but also required a certain 
image of a democratic society that with respect to Karst did not or could not exist in 
reality. Second, Karst argued that the desired image of Innere Führung was vague 
because the founding fathers of Innere Führung only presented a negative definition––
enumerating arguments that were not part of Innere Führung––and did not provide a 
clear message on how Innere Führung had to be understood in terms of military, social, 
and political importance for the Bundeswehr and for the German people.59 
According to Karst, the Menschenführung (soldierly leadership and command 
over people) is the key element of Innere Führung, by which the Bundeswehr and 
superiors actually have a responsibility to promote organizational changes and military 
progress. As Karst argued, the priority was the will and the ability to master the order of 
battle, and he concluded that “the paramount objective of soldierly leadership can only be 
to train young citizens to military efficiency.”60 Because mastering the order of battle and 
exploring military efficiency was no option for the German military in the years of 1955 
to 1994, Karst criticized the potential evolution of the armed forces that lose sight of their 
57 Article 87a Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany: “The Federation shall establish Armed 
Forces for purposes of defense;” Bundesministerium der Justiz, Basic Law for the Federal Republic of 
Germany (Berlin: Bundesministerium der Justiz, 1949), accessed on March 30, 2014, http://www 
.iuscomp.org/gla/statutes/GG.htm#87a. 
58 Karst, “Menschenführung in der Bundeswehr,” 114‒5. 
59 Dieter Walz, “Fragen an die Begründer der Inneren Führung,” in Drei Jahrzehnte Innere Führung: 
Grundlagen, Entwicklungen, Perspektiven, ed. Dieter Walz (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 1987), 17‒20. 
60 Ibid., 25. 
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real purpose and would train “workers in uniform,” who escape into their civilian lives 
after the daily hours of service solely.61 
C. VON BAUDISSIN: SOLDIERS FOR PEACE 
Only a Bundeswehr with officers who understand peacekeeping as its 
mission––ready for commitment to a free and peaceful future––can expect 
youth’s respect.62 
–Lieutenant General Wolf Graf von Baudissin 
Wolf Graf von Baudissin saw five essential tasks of the armed forces that were of 
concern in addition to the defense of life and liberty of free German people. First, armed 
forces––by their mere presence and size––can deter the potential enemy from conducting 
an attack; mirroring a neorealist standpoint. Thereby, they reduce the fear of an attack in 
the population, which has an impact on the social climate of the populace: action and not 
reaction in terms of political and military effort prevail. Hence, the military can be used 
as a tool to overcome the cooperation dilemma within international relations to establish 
a common and peaceful Europe.63 Additionally, the armed forces can introduce young 
people to the system of the state and its institutions and thus provide governmental 
guidance for future civilian occupations.64 
In times of deterrence that would culminate in a total war (including mutual 
assured destruction with a nuclear annihilation), Baudissin stressed that the only job for 
soldiers must be to stand up for peace and to avoid any escalation that could end in a 
war.65 As he argued, there “is no political goal, which may be pursued with military 
61 Walz, “Fragen an die Begründer der Inneren Führung,” 22. 
62 Quotation translated by the author; Wolf Graf von Baudissin, Soldat für den Frieden (München: S. 
Piper, 1969), 21.  
63 The cooperation dilemma within international relations is a result of the anarchic international 
system in which sovereign states pursue their genuine national interests. Sovereign states are the primary 
actors in a leaderless world and maintain the social and political order within their territory. Joint and 
combined military operations (e.g., NATO and European Union cooperations) are based on similar national 
interests and values and create trust between states’ authorities, organizations, and individuals. Therefore, 
military as a tool can solidify cooperative behavior based on improved and secured relations between 
states. 
64 Baudissin, Soldat für den Frieden, 24. 
65 Ibid. 
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means.”66 Therefore, he demanded a fundamental reform of German military thinking by 
“using peace as the core motive of soldierly service.”67 Against this background, 
Baudissin argued that armed forces could make an important contribution to a policy of 
deterrence and peacekeeping only by their size, equipment, and morale. However, he 
underscored the importance of paying attention to the scope of deterrence at the same 
time. Military actions in an armed conflict did not aim for the maximum destruction of 
the enemy. According to Baudissin, the aim had to be to act to the extent that the statu 
quo res erant ante bellum could be restored.68 More specifically, he remarked that 
modern soldiers should not necessarily be trained to kill or die for mission success if 
other––milder––means of the use of force could be used to fulfill the mission. This point 
of view indicated a crucial difference in whether “killing and dying … are regarded as an 
end in itself … or as a consequence of the mission with its orders.”69 
In particular, Baudissin touted the importance of civic education because it 
exerted the biggest influence on soldiers and thus formed the greatest contribution to 
peace.70 In other words, achievements in terms of leadership and civic education within 
the Bundeswehr could be transferred with the ideal of the “citizen in uniform” directly 
into the German society; solidifying the will of the people to a peaceful life 
consequently.71 As Baudissin argued, “[leadership and civic education] directly and 
indirectly influence society and determine the reliability of the institution [Bundeswehr] 
as a tool for peace and security policy.”72 He left no doubt that every German citizen 
must understand that people could not exist without a society, and they must make their 
contribution to maintain the social and political system. If these social and political 
66 Baudissin, Soldat für den Frieden, 24. 
67 Ibid., 28. 
68 In other words, soldiers conduct operations to establish the state in which things are as they were 
before the war. Baudissin, Soldat für den Frieden, 37‒41. 
69 Baudissin, Soldat für den Frieden, 41. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Abenheim, Bundeswehr und Tradition, 61. 
72 Baudissin, Soldat für den Frieden, 41. 
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aspects of leadership were disregarded, Baudissin viewed the danger of the emergence of 
spiraling traditional values that in turn would oppose peace.73 
D. COMPARISON: KARST-BAUDISSIN ON GERMAN MILITARY 
PROFESSIONALISM 
Both Karst as a representative of the traditionalists and Baudissin as a reformer 
affirmed the core values of Innere Führung. They strongly supported the main idea that 
soldiers were only willing to stand up for a cause if they understood and experienced the 
cause. With respect to the principle of legitimation, both underlined the importance of 
human dignity and civic rights to the maximum extent in order to ethically and socially 
consolidate a soldier’s character and behavior.  
While integration––as another fundamental principle––was seen as a vital 
necessity for successful armed forces, Karst and Baudissin expressed divergent 
arguments and implications for military professionalism. Baudissin regarded the military 
as a kind of school of the nation that had to teach its citizens to stand up for the German 
state and its society. Karst claimed that Baudissin’s understanding of teaching the society 
was not the key idea because this social and political process must be generated from 
within society. This argument was one of the main criticisms of Karst because he was 
convinced that Innere Führung rested on an understanding of society that was not found 
in reality. For Karst, the aspect of motivation was intertwined with legitimation and 
integration. When society and superiors fostered legitimation and integration, motivation 
would thrive by itself.  
Admittedly, Karst had a very positive view of the soldier’s nature. Baudissin 
highlighted the Bundeswehr’s purpose for the society and thus enforced superiors’ 
special responsibility to keep citizens in uniform motivated. There is only little discourse 
on the design of the internal order between Karst and Baudissin—or their successors and 
followers. The traditionalists and the reformers have seen that the context of internal 
order has created the balance between humane treatment and effective mission success. 
73 Wolf Graf von Baudissin, “Gedanken zur Inneren Führung,” in Zurückgestutzt, sinnentleert, 
unverstanden: Die Innere Führung der Bundeswehr, ed. Detlef Bald, Hans-Günter Fröhling, Jürgen Groß 
and Claus Freiherr von Rosen (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2008), 85‒6. 
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Hence, this aspect is similarly accepted like the viewpoints on legitimation. In sum, it is 
important to recognize that neither Karst (traditionalist) nor Baudissin (reformer) 
criticized the core principles of Innere Führung. 
The essential controversy between Karst and Baudissin was based on 
fundamentally different views on the role of the military. With respect to the atomic age 
and the chance of total destruction, they agreed that no soldier wanted to fight and 
preferred peace necessarily. Karst took a much reduced view of the task of the armed 
forces. While the traditionalists saw the preparation and conduct of military operations as 
the only task of the military, the reformers argued for additional far-reaching––political 
and social––duties next to the ability and the will to fight.74 In addition to deterrence and 
combat duties, occupational guidance, education of the society, and support of political 
cooperation in the international realm were equally important. In sum, Karst expected 
citizens to take the uniform and perform the duties that they have learned from society, 
while Baudissin assumed that the Bundeswehr––with conscription—trained and educated 
people as citizens in uniform in the end.  
According to Baudissin, the Bundeswehr has also possessed a crucial political and 
social component.75 Conversely, Karst claimed, “the integration of soldiers in society 
takes a lesser place in the possible civil appearance of the soldier [citizen in uniform] than 
the resolute readiness and willingness to defend the German people.”76 For this reason, 
the educational aspect of the military differed significantly between Karst and Baudissin. 
While Baudissin demanded more political education to foster citizens in uniform, Karst 
preferred to reduce deficits of superiors and soldiers in terms of military professionalism. 
Hence, Karst highlighted combat-willingness of soldiers and the Wehrhaftigkeit (spirit of 
defense) of Germany.77 
74 Nägler, Der gewollte Soldat und sein Wandel: Personelle Rüstung und Innere Führung in den 
Aufbaujahren der Bundeswehr 1956 bis 1964/65 (München: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2010), 129. 
75 Rudolf Hamann, “Abschied vom Staatsbürger in Uniform: Fünf Thesen zum Verfall der Inneren 
Führung,” in Zurückgestutzt, sinnentleert, unverstanden: Die Innere Führung der Bundeswehr, ed. Detlef 
Bald, Hans-Günter Fröhling, Jürgen Groß, Claus Freiherr von Rosen (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2008), 
31. 
76 Walz, “Fragen an die Begründer der Inneren Führung,” 40; Nägler, Der gewollte Soldat, 130. 
77 Nägler, Der gewollte Soldat, 38. 
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Finally, the discourse between traditionalists and reformers challenged the 
question of whether democracy or military effectiveness should have a higher value in 
the Bundeswehr.78 More specifically, the debate has been about whether there are armed 
forces in a democracy or democracy within the armed forces.79 Both views present 
different implications for military professionalism and operations: A military in a 
democracy may be capable and willing solely to fight, but a democracy in a military has 
to fulfill diverse and additional tasks to be mission successful. While Karst feared a 
demilitarization of soldiers’ nature, Baudissin saw the chance to civilize the military.80 
This controversy on the nature, the use, and the importance of armed forces for a 
modern German state did not end with the German unification. Indeed, they have even 
intensified against the background of new military adaptation to allies’ demands and 
operational requirements, reductions in the size of the Bundeswehr in the event of the 
peace dividend, and new––multinational––missions in terms of quality and quantity 
outside of Europe on a global horizon since 1990.81 The Bundeswehr has evolved to suit 
the new political, social, and military challenges including civil protection, emergency 
management, peacekeeping and peace-enforcing missions, humanitarian aid, and the 
global war on terrorism. These political, social, and military dynamics fueled the debates 
between the traditionalists and the reformers that led among other factors to the first 
amendment of Innere Führung on behalf of the Minister of Defense Volker Rühe in 1993 
and to another extensively revised version under Minister of Defense Jung on the eve of 
Germany’s engagement and participation in high-intensity military operations in 
78 Groß, “Innere Führung,” 10. 
79 Ibid., 7. 
80 Jürgen Rose, “Vision ‘Zivilisierung des Militärs:’ Thesen zur Inneren Führung des 21. 
Jahrhunderts,” in Zurückgestutzt, sinnentleert, unverstanden: Die Innere Führung der Bundeswehr, ed. 
Detlef Bald, Hans-Günter Fröhling, Jürgen Groß and Claus Freiherr von Rosen (Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlag, 2008), 141. 
81 Chiari and Pahl, Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr, 12–7. 
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Afghanistan in 2008.82 In a nutshell, not only the political and social but in particular the 
military developments abroad forced the Federal Ministry of Defense to amend Innere 
Führung to the current demands of operational forces that mirrored controversial aspects 
and arguments of the debates already known from Karst and Baudissin.  
82 King, Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces, 192–5; Claus Freiherr von Rosen, “Innere 
Führung und Einsatz aus Perspektive der Pädagogik,” in Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: 
Sozialwissenschaftliche Analysen, Diagnosen und Perspektiven, ed. Sabine Jaberg, Heiko Biehl, Günter 
Mohrmann and Maren Tomforde (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2009), 165, 179–82; Elmar Wiesendahl, 
“Zur Aktualität der Inneren Führung von Baudissin für das 21. Jahrhundert: Ein analytischer 
Bezugsrahmen,” in Innere Führung für das 21. Jahrhundert: Die Bundeswehr und das Erbe Baudissins, ed. 
Elmar Wiesendahl (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2007), 13–6. 
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III. ISAF AND OEF: PEACEKEEPING IN KABUL AND A 
CONVENTIONAL WAR 
Today, international terrorism is the biggest threat to the freedom and security of 
the international system. The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, in New York, 
Washington, D.C., and Pennsylvania illustrated that “international terrorists … pose an 
immediate threat that can have a wide range of implications for state and society” that 
jeopardizes nation coherence and survival.83 Terrorist attacks had already been conducted 
before 2001, and history shows that nonstate actors were used by some states to covertly 
pursue national interests. After the terrible attacks in 2001, however, the academic 
community and state authorities questioned the sources and effects of terrorism and the 
solutions for it.84  
Terrorism is a contested term without a “universally accepted definition” but a 
reasonable explanation incorporates “violence by nonstate actors that is directed against 
noncombatants, intended to coerce or garner support among particular audiences rather 
than to win on the battlefield, or both.”85 A realist perspective attributes to terrorism an 
intentional ideological, political character with the attempt to affect, to influence, or to 
change political realities. In short, a realist lens allows for an understanding of terrorism 
in which nonstate actors “follow a strategic logic” of coercion.86  
Terrorists are rational actors and “political utility maximizers; people use 
terrorism when the expected political gains minus the expected costs outweigh the net 
expected benefits of alternative forms of protest.”87 Thus, states can adapt strategies and 
83 Federal Ministry of Defense, Defense Policy Guidelines: Safeguarding National Interests – 
Assuming International Responsibility – Shaping Security Together (Berlin: Federal Ministry of Defense, 
2011), 2. 
84 S. Paul Kapur and Sumit Ganguly, “The Jihad Paradox: Pakistan and Islamist Militancy in South 
Asia,” International Security 37, no. 1 (2012): 111‒41. 
85 Alexander Charles Carlile, The Definition of Terrorism (London: The Stationery Office, 2007), 3; 
Kapur and Ganguly, “The Jihad Paradox,” 111. 
86 Robert A. Pape, “The Strategic Logic of Terrorism,” American Political Science Review 97, no. 3 
(2003): 2. 
87 Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” 
International Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 78. 
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build up structures to counteract terrorism. State actors have the choice between two 
coercive strategies: punishment or denial.88 One has to keep in mind that states are 
exposed to political and social complications while fighting terrorism. Most likely, state 
actors do not know who to bargain with, to evade, to deter, or to attack. “Terrorism is an 
extremism of means” that must be encountered with a wide range of means taking the full 
state repertoire of political, economic, and military tools into account, generally starting 
with “stronger border controls to make it more difficult for terrorists” to enter homelands 
but primarily with fighting terrorism at its place of origin.89 Thus, after the terrorist 
attacks on the World Trade Center, the United States made not only clear that “allies of 
terror are the enemies of civilization” but also mobilized its military forces, started a war 
on terror, and attacked Afghanistan, which was defined as a harbor for terrorists and an 
ally of terror.90 
In response to the terrorist attacks and after President George W. Bush’s 
declaration of war on terrorism, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) rated these 
“horrifying terrorist attacks … as a threat to international peace and security” and 
committed its further actions “to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist 
attacks.”91 The UNSC thereby highlighted the “inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense” under the provision of Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) Charter.92 
Additionally, the NATO Council confirmed for the first time in history that an attack had 
been conducted from abroad––Afghanistan––and thus the NATO members considered 
these attacks to be “against them all and consequently they … assist the Party or Parties 
so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such 
88 Pape, “Strategic Logic of Terrorism,” 4. 
89 Pape, “Strategic Logic of Terrorism,” 415; Abrahms, “Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism 
Strategy,” 86. 
90 George W. Bush, Declaration of War on Terrorism, modified on September 20, 2001, http://www 
.britannica.com/presidents/article-9398253; The White House, The National Security Strategy of the United 
States of America (Washington: The White House, 2002), accessed on February 6, 2014, http://www.state 
.gov/documents/organization/63562.pdf, v. 
91 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1368 (2001) Threats to international peace and 
security caused by terrorist acts, September 12, 2001, accessed on February 6, 2014, http://www.un.org 
/docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm.  
92 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, accessed on February 3, 2014, http://www.un.org/en 
/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml.  
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action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the 
security of the North Atlantic area.”93 Thus, a nation’s inherent right of self-defense and 
the implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty consequently led the United 
States to invade Afghanistan in October 2001 and further activated willing nations to 
engage with political, economic, and military means in Afghanistan. 
A. GERMANY’S UNLIMITED SOLIDARITY AND OEF I–III 
Immediately after the terroristic attacks, German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
declared in front of the Bundestag unlimited solidarity of the German people with the 
United States and ensured political, economic, military support to fight international 
terrorism.94 Against the background of a full support of the opposing union parties 
Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CDU/CSU) 
and Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Bundestag passed a resolution to politically, 
economically, and militarily support the United States with an absolute majority. The 
coalition votes, however, indicated political struggles within the rows of the ruling 
coalition of Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and Alliance ‘90/The Greens 
because the coalition would have only gained an own majority by a few votes.95 The 
political dilemma of the government was evident and Chancellor Schröder pushed the 
SPD and Alliance ‘90/The Greens with new arguments––alliance obligations to prevent a 
“humanitarian catastrophe”––to support military operations.96 The military support 
comprised a maximum of 3,900 German soldiers and included nuclear, biological, 
chemical (NBC) defense forces, units for medical evacuation (MEDEVAC), Special 
93 The North Atlantic Treaty, (Washington, D.C., April 4, 1949), accessed on February 6, 2014, 
http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/stock_publications/20120822_nato_treaty_en_light_2009.pdf; 
NATO Online Library, Bilateral Meeting NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson and U.S. President 
George W. Bush, updated on April 11, 2002, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2002/s020409a.htm. 
94 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/186 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001), 
accessed on February 18, 2014, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/14/14186.pdf, 18293; Deutscher 
Bundestag, Entschließungsantrag der Fraktionen SPD, CDU/CSU, BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN und FDP 
14/6920 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001), 1‒2. 
95 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/187 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001), 
accessed on February 18, 2014, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/14/14187.pdf, 18337–9.  
96 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/198 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001), 
accessed on February 18, 2014, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/14/14198.pdf, 19284–5.  
 31 
                                                 
Operations Forces, air transport forces, and naval forces.97 Within a few days, the 
Bundestag was confronted with an argumentation shift from granting unlimited solidarity 
to planning serious, intensive warfare operation under the umbrella of a U.S.-led coalition 
of Operation Enduring Freedom that relied on self-defense and had no United Nations 
mandate. This political shift spread dissent among the members of the Federal 
Government and jeopardized a stable political condition for the upcoming election on the 
OEF resolution of the Bundestag.  
While the Bundestag debated Germany’s participation and military contribution, 
the United States and the United Kingdom launched air strikes independently from 
NATO and the United Nations because Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers ignored the 
American ultimatum to hand over Osama bin Laden.98 In the initial phase of the 
Afghanistan war, British and American forces established in Afghanistan a military 
footprint with less than 2,500 soldiers to “conduct locally limited high intensity war-
fighting against the Taliban forces around Kandahar” and to support the United Islamic 
Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (Afghan Northern Alliance), which fought side by 
side with the Western powers against the Taliban regime.99 
The German political debate escalated about the legality of military participation 
in Afghanistan; the coalition between SPD and Alliance ‘90/The Greens seemed to break 
apart, putting internal and external political viability of Schröder’s coalition at risk. Only 
the Bundestag’s vote of confidence for Chancellor Schröder in November 2001 stopped 
the political fragmentation.  
  
97 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/198, 19284; Antrag der Bundesregierung, Einsatz 
bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte bei der Unterstützung der gemeinsamen Reaktion auf terroristische 
Angriffe gegen die USA auf Grundlage des Artikels 51 der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen und des Artikels 
5 des Nordatlantikvertrags sowie der Resolution 1368 (2001) und 1373 (2001) des Sicherheitsrats der 
Vereinten Nationen 14/7296 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001), 3–4. 
98 “Taliban Won’t Turn Over Bin Laden,” CBS Worldwide, updated on September 11, 2001, http:// 
www.cbsnews.com/news/taliban-wont-turn-over-bin-laden/. 
99 Andreas Kuehne, “Scrutinizing and assessing the performance of the German and U.S.-led 
provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2008), 
http://calhoun.nps.edu/public/handle/10945/4117, 19.  
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Although in political debates the German government emphasized the inescapable 
constraints of the international situation and the declaration of war on terrorism that 
forced German commitment, which left no choice but to participate in OEF combat 
missions––a clear third image theory100––Chancellor Schröder only marginally won the 
vote of confidence. The government passed a mandate on OEF with 336 of the 662 
members of the Bundestag in favor, a win with a majority of four votes.101 This 
development in the Bundestag illustrated two factors that played a role well after 
deploying troops to Afghanistan. First, Schröder managed to silence members of the 
German government to solidify his remaining term in office and to continue the coalition 
between SPD and Alliance ‘90/The Greens in the Bundestag. Second, the political 
debates and disagreements illustrated the Bundestag’s aimlessness with respect to 
Afghanistan’s future and uncertainty about military interventions and deployment of 
German troops to Afghanistan. This political dissent and political party loyalty led to the 
first mandate on German military participation in Afghanistan (OEF I). 
One year later, the meaning of OEF and Germany’s projection of military force 
dominated the second Bundestag debate (OEF II). While the government stressed the 
threat of international terrorism and the importance of friendship and solidarity in a 
multipolar world, the opposition challenged the will of the government to use the full 
100 Different theories may fall into distinct theoretical baskets—first, second, or third image 
arguments—that provide a proper way to classify theories in the academic field of international relations. 
Each basket takes a causal argumentation into account to explain state behavior in the international system. 
First image theories view human nature as an a priori determinant for state behavior. Second image 
theories focus on the internal character of states, which has an influence on the state behavior. In other 
words, some states are more aggressive or passive by nature, which reflects an inside-out argument on their 
international behavior. Third image theories emphasize the importance of external factors that override 
internal domestic conditions. These theories regard the anarchic architecture of the international system, 
which exerts severe and inescapable constraints, as determinant for state behavior. Particularly, 
neoliberalism presents a third image theory because it illustrates that not only institutions within the state 
and in the international system affect state behavior but also that the anarchic structure of the international 
system impacts interactions between states; Robert Axelrod and Robert I. Keohane, “Achieving 
Cooperation Under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions,” in Neorealism and Neoliberalism: The 
Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 8‒9, 11. 
101 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/202 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001), 
accessed on February 18, 2014, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/14/14202.pdf, 19857, 19893.  
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extent of the OEF mandate.102 The debate addressed the problem that the German forces 
lacked government backup to take all military means by fighting international terrorism 
according to OEF II terms and thus to fulfill their mission as mandated by the 
Bundestag.103 The criticisms did not affect the decision on the mandate and it was passed 
without much dissent; however, discrepancies between the need of military force and the 
willingness to politically accept military interventions became evident.  
In 2003, the Bundestag passed the third mandate on OEF. The deployment plan of 
the German government determined to withdraw the NBC defense forces stationed in 
Kuwait and thus reduce the OEF numbers of soldiers to 3,100.104 The debate shed light 
on another political discrepancy that was not only a specific to OEF but also seemed to be 
part of German former military interventions. One parliament member expressed 
incomprehension and discontent as to why the Bundestag should pass a mandate for the 
deployment of 3,100 soldiers when only 700 German soldiers were deployed, and 
furthermore, no arguments or plans for additional deployments had been made by the 
government.105 With respect to former German missions abroad, this disproportion was 
nothing new; however, a ratio of 4.4 (3,100 mandated soldiers/700 deployed soldiers) 
exceeded the ratio of the Kosovo Force (KFOR with 2.4 in 2003) and the Stabilization 
102 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 15/11 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001), 
accessed on February 18, 2014, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/15/15011.pdf, 654; Antrag der 
Bundesregierung, Fortsetzung des Einsatzes bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte bei der Unterstützung der 
gemeinsamen Reaktion auf terroristische Angriffe gegen die USA auf Grundlage des Artikels 51 der 
Satzung der Vereinten Nationen und des Artikels 5 des Nordatlantikvertrags sowie der Resolutionen 1368 
(2001) und 1373 (2001) des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen 15/37 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001), 4‒5. 
103 Antrag der Bundesregierung, Fortsetzung des Einsatzes bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte bei der 
Unterstützung der gemeinsamen Reaktion auf terroristische Angriffe gegen die USA auf Grundlage des 
Artikels 51 der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen und des Artikels 5 des Nordatlantikvertrags sowie der 
Resolutionen 1368 (2001) und 1373 (2001) des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen 15/37 (Berlin: 
Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001), 4. 
104 Antrag der Bundesregierung, Fortsetzung des Einsatzes bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte bei der 
Unterstützung der gemeinsamen Reaktion auf terroristische Angriffe gegen die USA auf Grundlage des 
Artikels 51 der Satzung der Vereinten Nationen und des Artikels 5 des Nordatlantikvertrags sowie der 
Resolutionen 1368 (2001) und 1373 (2001) des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen 15/1880 (Berlin: 
Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003), 2. 
105 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 15/73 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003), 
accessed on February 18, 2014, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/15/15073.pdf, 6294.  
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Force (SFOR with 2.3 in 1998) by far.106 While OEF differed in military, political, and 
geographical dimensions in general and in conflict, as well as in warfare intensity in 
particular from KFOR and SFOR, the mandate/deployment ratio served as an indicator 
that the German government was uncertain what OEF, its military content, and 
implications really included.107 From the German government’s point of view, it would 
be reasonable to keep a flexible option to deploy additional soldiers when needed but 
from the parliament’s standpoint, it undercut the genuine principle of a parliamentary 
army because the deciding vote for military deployment had been lost. 
B. BONN AGREEMENT AND ISAF I–II 
In November 2001, the UNSC condemned “the Taliban for allowing Afghanistan 
to be used as a base for the export of terrorism by the Al-Qaida network and other 
terrorist groups” and made clear that the United Nations would “play a central role in 
supporting the efforts of the Afghan people to establish … a new and transitional 
administration.”108 In his report on the situation in Afghanistan, the Special 
Representative of the Secretary General for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, highlighted 
that a multinational engagement would be a difficult peacekeeping mission that would 
encounter significant hostilities and endure several years.109 UN Resolution 1378 and 
Brahimi’s report initiated a conference on the Petersberg near Bonn that addressed further 
actions to promote peace in Afghanistan and to rebuild the Afghan government.110 In 
December, the Petersberg Conference established an Afghan Interim Administration and 
proclaimed an “early deployment to Afghanistan of a United Nations mandated force,” 
106 von Neubeck, “Transformation der Bundeswehr,” 434. 
107 Ibid. 
108 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1378 (2001) on the situation in Afghanistan, 
November 14, 2001, accessed on February 6, 2014, http://www.un.org/docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm.  
109 Lakhdar Brahimi, Sonderbeauftragter des Generalsekretärs für Afghanistan, “Unterrichtung des 
Sicherheitsrats am 13 November 2001,” accessed on February 4, 2014, http://www.un.org/Depts/german/ 
sr/sr_sonst/brahimi_nov01.pdf.  
110 Hans-Georg Ehrhart and Roland Kaestner, “Afghanistan: Scheitern oder Strategiewechsel,” in 
Armee im Einsatz, ed. Hans J. Gießmann and Armin Wagner (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2009), 381. 
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initially to provide security for Kabul and its adjacent areas.111 After the Petersberg 
Conference, the UNSC authorized in accordance with the Agreement on Provisional 
Arrangements in Afghanistan “the establishment for six months of an International 
Security Assistance Force to assist the Afghan Interim Authority” to maintain the security 
in and around Kabul with all necessary measures and to provide a secure environment for 
the personnel of the United Nations.112 
The German government welcomed the decisions of the UNSC and the Petersberg 
Conference and discussed Germany’s future position with respect to the upcoming UN 
mandate in Kabul. A clear difference between the debates on OEF and on the 
participation according to the Petersberg Conference is evident and reflects Germany’s 
“traditional preference for multilateral, humanitarian approach to conflict.”113 While the 
Bundestag criticized military operations and German participation in OEF that almost led 
to a breakup of the government only a few weeks earlier, the Bundestag was at this point 
keen to step into the lead nation position by highlighting three points.114 First, German 
troops had a peacemaking advantage because they were not part of the initial attacks in 
Afghanistan. Second, Germany had had good relations with Afghanistan in the past 
because it had invested in infrastructure in and around Kabul before World War II. Thus, 
it had no unhappy colonial history there like Britain or France, nor did Germany have any 
legacy of unrequited expectations, like the United States. Moreover, it was not perceived 
to have any neo-colonial interest in that region.115  
111 United Nations, Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
Establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, accessed on February 6, 2014, http://www.un.org 
/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm. 
112 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1386 (2001) on the situation in Afghanistan, 
December 20, 2001, accessed on February 6, 2014, http://www.un.org/docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm. 
113 Lucas Charles Neece, “Enduring Alliance Solidarity: Germany in Afghanistan,” in Auftrag 
Auslandseinsatz: Neueste Militärgeschichte an der Schnittstelle von Geschichtswissenschaft, Politik, 
Öffentlichkeit und Streitkräften, ed. Bernhard Chiari (Berlin: Rombach Verlag, 2012), 229. 
114 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/210 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001), 
accessed on February 18, 2014, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/14/14210.pdf, 20834.  
115 Nick Cullather, “Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State,” The Journal of 
American History 89, no. 2, (2002): 518–9. 
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Third, Germany hosted the first conference––Petersberg Conference––that set the 
cornerstone for a peaceful future for the Afghan people.116 After German Foreign 
Minister, Joschka Fischer, explained in front of the German Committee on Foreign 
Affairs that Germany had no national interest in that region and thus argued against a 
lead nation position,117 the Bundestag debates shifted from arguments on solidarity to 
questions about national interest and challenged the German government’s plan of action 
in international relations. 
These debates, however, did not affect the support of the mandate on ISAF, which 
was passed with a majority of more than 90 percent of the members of the Bundestag.118 
The mandate was based on the UNSC Resolution 1386 and on the agreements from the 
Petersberg Conference and entailed the deployment of 1,200 German soldiers to maintain 
the security in and around Kabul for an operational term of initially six months.119 
Chancellor Schröder’s initial assumption on German participation in ISAF pointed out 
that not all mandates required soldiers for that kind of mission. Furthermore, he implied 
the German deployment would stay below the number of soldiers initially passed by the 
legislature; ironically, after six months the Bundestag debated and passed a request for an 
additional 200 soldiers for ISAF.120 
The shift in arguments to explain and justify German participation in ISAF 
became apparent in the subsequent ISAF yearly debates. On ISAF II (second Bundestag 
mandate on ISAF) Minister of Defense Dr. Peter Struck highlighted the aim of German 
military participation to deny terrorists safe haven and training space in Afghanistan. The 
main point of his speech, however, was to address the new tasks of the Bundeswehr: 
116 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/210, 20834. 
117 Ibid. 
118 Ibid., 20850. 
119Antrag der Bundesregierung, Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte an dem Einsatz einer 
Internationalen Sicherheitsunterstützungstruppe in Afghanistan auf Grundlage der Resolutionen 1386 
(2001), 1383 (2001) und 1378 (2001) des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten Nationen 14/7930 (Berlin: 
Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001), 3–4. 
120 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 14/210, 20823; Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 
14/243 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002), accessed on February 18, 2014, http://dipbt 
.bundestag.de/doc/btp/14/14243.pdf, 24465.  
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defending Germany together with allies and partners with military means against 
international terrorism where it is at home.121 After German troops had served for one 
year in Afghanistan, the Bundestag listened to a monologue that precisely articulated 
German national interest and presented an understanding of security and defense that 
sought to keep threats and crises away from Germany and its allies. Dr. Struck left no 
doubt that German military involvement served national security interest only to 
guarantee Germany’s defense. Thus, missions in Afghanistan, in the Balkans, or at the 
Horn of Africa had the same underlying principle of German security politics: German 
defense.122  
The connection of military missions far from Germany and their use for German 
extended territorial defense seemed to fit perfectly. Some members of the Bundestag, 
however, did not share this point of view, and challenged continued German ISAF 
participation.123 In particular, the reasoning of national interests of Germany was 
challenged because German extended territorial defense seemed to be misleading. The 
Bundestag saw the focus on fighting international terrorism together with allies and 
partners in Afghanistan.124 Other criticism came up because ISAF had already exceeded 
pre-planned costs, and the deteriorating security situation outside of Kabul created doubts 
about the success of ISAF. Several government statements borrowed these criticisms and 
emphasized a disproportion between ISAF soldiers and Afghan armed men in and around 
Kabul.125  
  
121 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 15/17 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2002), 
accessed on February 18, 2014, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/15/15017.pdf, 1314.  
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Consequently, the German government demanded an increase of the number of 
German soldiers to 2,500.126 The German mandate on ISAF II was passed with a 
majority of 565 of 576 delegates.127 The broad political acceptance of the Bundestag 
changed in 2003 when the government proclaimed its will to extend military intervention 
beyond Kabul (ISAF III). 
C. TWOFOLD MILITARY WAY: OEF VIS-À-VIS ISAF 
With respect to the Bundestag mandates and the deployment of German soldiers 
to Afghanistan, Germany’s military intervention encompassed a twofold design. First, 
German Special Operations Forces were engaged in the U.S.-led OEF mission against 
international terrorism.128 Second, German soldiers were part of ISAF and deployed to 
Kabul “to assist the Afghan Interim Authority in the maintenance of security in Kabul 
and its surrounding areas.”129 The double mandate for two inherently different missions 
in Afghanistan enabled the German government to fulfill allied demands for conducting 
warfare against an enemy and to use German soldiers for peacekeeping missions, a 
mission dimension the German military was familiar with (e.g., Somalia, Bosnia, 
Kosovo). It also allowed the government to distract attention from the bad image of 
OEF––which was not backed by a UN mandate––with a good image of ISAF that 
promoted the post-conflict image of the Bundeswehr.130  
  
126 Deutscher Bundestag, Plenarprotokoll 15/17, 1315. 
127 Ibid., 1332. 
128 King, Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces, 25. 
129 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1386 (2001) on the situation in Afghanistan, 
December 20, 2001, accessed on February 6, 2014, http://www.un.org/docs/scres/2001/sc2001.htm, 2. 
130 Klaus Naumann, “A Troubled Partnership: Zum Verhältnis von Politik und Militär im ISAF-
Einsatz,” in Der Einsatz der Bundeswehr in Afghanistan: Sozial- und politikwissenschaftliche Perspektiven, 
ed. Anja Seiffert, Phil C. Langer, Carsten Pietsch (Wiesbaden: Springer VS Verlag, 2012), 51–2; Christian 
Freuding, “Die Operation Enduring Freedom und Active Endeavour: Deutschlands militärischer Beitrag 
zum Kampf gegen den internationalen Terrorismus,” in Armee im Einsatz: Grundlagen, Strategien und 
Ergebnisse einer Beteiligung der Bundeswehr, ed. Armin Wagner, Hans J. Gießmann (Baden-Baden: 
Nomos Verlag, 2009), 341. 
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For German soldiers, it meant a functional differentiation.131 On the one hand, 
OEF soldiers conducted conventional and highly intensive combat against the Taliban 
regime, and, on the other, ISAF soldiers started to become engaged in military operations 
other than war (MOOTW), which are according to former UN Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjöld “no jobs for a soldier, but only a soldier can do it.”132 This differentiation 
led to different perspectives about the mission among soldiers within the Bundeswehr and 
to a focus on post-conflict interventions in and around Kabul by losing sight of the 
development in the rest of Afghanistan.133 
Initially, 100 Special Operations Forces soldiers (German KSK) conducted 
conventional warfare together with United States and United Kingdom Special 
Operations Forces in the southern part of Afghanistan (Kandahar) against Taliban 
forces.134 For the first time since World War II, Germany found itself planning and 
conducting conventional war. Thus, the deployment of the German KSK in Afghanistan 
was a serious paradigm shift in the era of Bundeswehr missions abroad. At the time, the 
deployment seemed to rely more on political promises than military necessity.135 The 
controversial former KSK commander, General Reinhard Günzel, who was later relieved, 
stated that initial operations in Afghanistan demanded specialized forces and regular 
military troops rather than genuine Special Forces capabilities.136  
131 Warburg, “Paradoxe Anforderungen,” 70. 
132 James V. Arbuckle, “Analysis: Not a Job for a Soldier,” NATO Review, accessed on February 16, 
2014, http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue3/english/analysis1.html. 
133 Lutz Holländer, “Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: Bilanz und Perspektive,” in Bundeswehr: Die 
nächsten 50 Jahre, Anforderungen an deutsche Streitkräfte im 21. Jahrhundert, ed. Jan C. Irlenkaeuser, 
Joachim Krause (Opladen: Verlag Barbara Budrich, 2006), 233. 
134 Reiner Pommerin, “Vom ‘Kalten Krieg’ zu globaler Konfliktverhütung und Krisenbewältigung: 
Militärgeschichte zwischen 1990 und 2006,” in Die Zeit nach 1945: Armee im Wandel, ed. Karl-Volker 
Neugebauer (Potsdam: Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2008), 384. 
135 von Neubeck, “Transformation der Bundeswehr,” 397–8. 
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While the war in Afghanistan was visible to the German populace, the actions of 
the German KSK were at this point neither known nor debated in the Bundestag.137 The 
German KSK took part alongside allied partners in several battle operations against 
Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, including the Battle of Tora Bora and Operation 
Anaconda.138 The main objective––besides supporting allied operations––was to capture 
members of the Taliban regime and the al-Qaeda network and to monitor border 
crossings to Pakistan.139 To these ends, the German KSK was embedded in the U.S. 
command and control architecture and also depended on U.S. operations because they 
lacked their own transport capabilities.140 After the conventional war ended, the German 
KSK controlled areas of interest in the southern part of Kabul.141 
The first regular German military forces (under the ISAF mandate) arrived in 
January 2002 after the Military Technical Agreement between ISAF and the Interim 
Administration of Afghanistan was signed.142 Upon their arrival, a military base close to 
Kabul was established (Camp Warehouse) and less than two weeks later, German 
soldiers started patrols in and around Kabul with unprotected vehicles to execute the 
ISAF mandate and to show force in the area of responsibility (AOR).143 The ISAF 
137 Uli Rauss, “Kommando Spezialkräfte: Die Profis,” Stern, updated on November 13, 2004, http:// 
www.stern.de/politik/deutschland/3-kommando-spezialkraefte-die-profis-531806.html; von Neubeck, 
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140 Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, “German Special Operations Forces: The Case for 
Revision,” SWP Comments 26 (Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2006), 2. 
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mission was understood to be a peacekeeping and, thus, nation-building mission similar 
to other already successfully conducted missions prominently like those on the Balkans. 
Furthermore, Germany had a good reputation among the Afghan government after the 
success of the Petersberg Conference, and German politicians and soldiers assumed they 
would be welcomed as partners to rebuild and secure Afghanistan’s capital.144  
Soldiers found themselves in a new environment that differed from the European 
continent where they had trained. Although the German military had already been 
involved in many international operations, the equipment had originally been designed 
for national defense purposes on German territory and was not suitable in the Afghan 
environment and for the ISAF mission. The lack of secure communication and strategic, 
tactical mobility became another critical factor.145 For instance, air transport relied on the 
C-160 Transall which was originally designed for operational, tactical transport between 
close battle zones in the European plains and their corresponding environmental 
conditions. In Afghanistan, however, where hot and high conditions and difficult 
environments prevail, the C-160 was not capable to perform continuous operations and 
was pushed to its transport limits, which resulted in takeoff/landing operations during 
summer nights only. Despite the lack of basic military equipment (e.g., secure 
communication) and necessary capabilities (e.g., logistics and transport assets), the 
security situation for German soldiers in Kabul seemed to be favorable. Thus, military 
safety regulations for combat zones were not of first concern.146  
In January 2002, Germany’s contribution to ISAF started with 1,200 soldiers in 
Afghanistan. An additional 160 German soldiers were stationed in Termez (Uzbekistan) 
where an air transport hub for logistics was established to conduct air transport flights 
from and to Kabul.147 By the end of 2002, the German Bundestag increased the number 
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146 Susanne Koelbl and Udo Ludwig, “Bundeswehr: Wie konnte das passieren?,” Der Spiegel 35 
(Hamburg: Spiegel-Verlag, 2003), accessed on February 16, 2014, http://wissen.spiegel.de/wissen/image 
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147 Pommerin, “Vom ‘Kalten Krieg’ zu globaler Konfliktverhütung und Krisenbewältigung,” 384–6. 
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of German troops to 2,500 soldiers.148 From 2002 until 2003, German soldiers conducted 
several support and humanitarian aid missions in and around Kabul as well as to the 
Hindu Kush Mountains. During the first two years, several soldiers were killed or 
wounded in accidents (e.g., CH-53 reconnaissance flight over Kabul) and from mine 
explosions.149  
Despite military intelligence information on thriving danger and aggravation of 
the security situation within the AOR in 2003, German political and military officials 
were caught by surprise when a pre-planned suicide attack on a German convoy––an 
unprotected bus––to the Kabul International Airport killed four soldiers and left 29 
soldiers injured, some seriously.150 A subsequent political and military assessment on the 
deteriorating security situation with a focus on the emergence of insurgents in and around 
Kabul was not conducted. 
D. CONCLUSION 
In Afghanistan, for the first time since World War II, German soldiers fought in a 
war. In other words, Germany not only defended itself and its allies in the Hindu Kush 
but was also involved in high-intensity combat. This controversial perspective sheds light 
on the twofold design of German military intervention in Afghanistan. On one side, the 
German government used the Special Forces of the Bundeswehr for political and military 
reasons to solidify Germany’s international position as a credible and trustworthy partner 
and to satisfy the operational demands of German allies. Furthermore, the German KSK 
were the only German forces deployed to the southern part of Afghanistan to fight side-
by-side with other partners of the U.S.-led coalition of OEF. 
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The German KSK is a force that is special in several aspects. First, its members 
are specially trained and equipped for primarily conducting unconventional warfare and 
thus, covertly, secret operations all over the world; meaning the German KSK knew what 
was at stake and were capable to execute combat tasks. Second, missions of the German 
KSK follow a different logic than deployments of German regular troops. Contrary to the 
deployment of regular troops, most German KSK deployments do not require a prior 
approval of the Bundestag due to their genuine missions.151 Thus, the use of this force is 
neither monitored nor debated in the Bundestag that deploys them to an area of national 
interest to fulfill their missions. In other words, the deployment of the German KSK in 
Afghanistan made it possible to slip silently into a new era of Bundeswehr missions 
abroad.  
On the other side, the German government followed its tradition to push for a 
multilateral peacekeeping and humanitarian solution to the emerging conflict in 
Afghanistan. The initial holding of the Petersberg Conference and the Bundestag’s 
readiness and willingness to contribute German soldiers for a peacekeeping operation 
under a UN mandate mirrored Germany’s tradition and practice of multilateral 
interventionism. How to deal, nationally and internationally, with peacekeeping 
operations and the impact of those operations on German soldiers were not only known 
but also seemed to fit the image and ideals of the German military. Regular German 
forces had already proved their expertise in peacekeeping and nation building operations 
in Africa and on the Balkans; now they were ready to do the same in Afghanistan. 
The long, hot debates and profound dissent in the Bundestag showed, however, 
that German politicians were not pleased with the twofold design of German military 
intervention in Afghanistan. Only Chancellor Schröder’s credible threat to break up the 
coalition silenced his members of the government, and thus, the coalition’s will to stay in 
power outweighed aspects of German soldiers not only defending Germany far off 
national territory but also fighting in a war. Although the Bundestag passed the first and 
following mandates most times with a legislative approval of more than 95 percent of the 
151 Bundesministerium der Justiz, Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz, § 5 (1) Nachträgliche Zustimmung. 
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members of the Bundestag,152 the debates on the different mandates always gave reasons 
to widen the parliament’s discussion, to challenge the government’s will to deploy 
soldiers, to request a coherent strategy for the Afghanistan mission, and to question 
Germany’s national interest. Legislative automatisms for debating and passing mandates 
stayed away, but most critical questions remained unanswered or were tackled in the 
following years of the ongoing OEF and ISAF missions—starting with the debate to 
expand ISAF beyond Kabul and its surrounding areas in 2003.  
152 von Neubeck, “Transformation der Bundeswehr,” 405, 516. 
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IV. MISSION DEFINES WHAT? PEACEKEEPING IN AND 
AROUND KABUL 
Looking at its essence, the military service is a very honorable, very fair, 
and very noble profession. The core of soldiering is nothing else than the 
defense of goodness, truth, and especially of those who are unjustly 
attacked.153  
–Pope Ioannes Paulus II 
 
In 2003, the German deployment was not limited to military participation in 
Afghanistan; German soldiers were involved in missions on the Balkans, in Africa, and in 
distant places on the Eurasian continent.154 The Afghanistan conflict, however, outshined 
the other German deployments in political and military complexity as well as uncertainty. 
Minister of Defense Rudolf Scharping rejected in 2002 any leadership role in 
Afghanistan, any expansion of military participation beyond the city border of Kabul, any 
additional deployments. Furthermore, one year later he proclaimed Berlin’s intent to 
withdraw German troops after the Afghan elections in 2004.155 In the same year, the 
course of events in Afghanistan, however, presented a different situation and military 
dynamic: Germany took a lead nation role in the Northern part of Afghanistan, the 
military contribution was expanded beyond Kabul, more German troops were requested 
by international allies, and a withdrawal of German troops after 2004 was no option; 
precisely, German troops and arms deployment as well as military tasks and operations 
increased after 2003 progressively. 
Different plans of action––for why and how to tackle the Afghan conflict––
between the OEF and ISAF participating nations fueled the aforementioned strategic 
ambiguity. While some nations demanded high-intensity warfare and kinetic 
counterterrorism operations, other nations preferred peacekeeping and nation building 
153 Quotation translated by the author; Johannes Paul II, “Militärdienst ist für die Gesellschaft 
nützlich,” in Der Apostolische Stuhl 1989: Ansprachen Predigten und Botschaften des Papstes, ed. 
Sekretariat der Deutschen Bischofskonferenz (Köln: Bachem Verlag, 1989), 867.  
154 Chiari and Pahl, Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr, 296–7. 
155 von Neubeck, “Transformation der Bundeswehr,” 507. 
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operations focusing on reconstruction and humanitarian aid.156 In particular, the latter 
mission understanding was––especially with respect to coalition governments––suitable 
to win public and political support. To gain a broad majority of supporters is crucial to 
coalition governments because different political parties constitute the government that 
formulates a common foreign political and military strategy. The necessity to gain 
support for military deployments from less pro-interventionist parties causes political 
ambiguities and compromises.157  
Thus, it is not surprising that the Bundestag debate on the Afghanistan conflict 
mainly started with humanitarian and security aspects to set the stage for German military 
involvement outside of the NATO Article VI territory.158 Although humanitarian and 
security aspects had been in the focus of former Bundeswehr missions, the same German 
political and military agendas did not fit the situation and development during the 
deteriorating security situation of the Afghan conflict.159 German military politics were 
designed for “domestic and foreign policy agendas rather than to circumstances on the 
ground.”160 In less than ten years, the German public and its politicians were not only 
confronted with German soldier wounded and deaths but also with a new Bundeswehr 
that was initially handcuffed with a costly risk minimization approach, and the need to 
conduct high-intensity warfare and implement counterinsurgency tactics to win support 
of local Afghan tribes.161  
156 Auerswald and Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan, 70. 
157 Ibid., 141. 
158 Bernhard Chiari, “Krieg als Reise? Neueste Militärgeschichte seit 1990 am Beispiel des 
militärischen und sicherheitspolitischen Wandels in Deutschland,” in Auftrag Auslandseinsatz: Neueste 
Militärgeschichte an der Schnittstelle von Geschichtswissenschaft, Politik, Öffentlichkeit und Streitkräften, 
ed. Bernhard Chiari (Berlin: Rombach Verlag, 2012), 50. 
159 Sebastian Merz, “Still on the Way to Afghanistan? Germany and Its Forces in the Hindu Kush,” 
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Project paper 2007, accessed on February 27, 2014, 
http://www.sipri.org/research/conflict/publications/merz, 3. 
160 Ibid., 13. 
161 Dirk Steinhoff, “Determinants and politics of German military transformation in the post-Cold 
War era,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2011), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5618, 128. 
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A. GERMAN ISAF EXPANSION AND PROVINCIAL RECONSTRUCTION 
TEAMS (PRT) IN AND AROUND KABUL 
In 2003, the UNSC adapted the ISAF mission and authorized ISAF expansion “to 
support the Afghan Transitional Authority … in the maintenance of security in areas of 
Afghanistan outside of Kabul and its environs,” to establish a secure environment and to 
guarantee the safety of the Afghan people, UN personnel, and members of other 
organizations.162 Thereby, all ISAF participating member states were authorized “to take 
all necessary measures to fulfill its mandate.”163 Two days after the UNSC mandate was 
issued, the Bundestag decided on an extended German ISAF contribution with a lead 
function for the ISAF expansion and ordered additional troops to Afghanistan (see  
Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2.  Bundestag force cap on German military deployment.164 
162 United Nations Security Council, Resolution 1510 (2003) Afghanistan, October 13, 2003, accessed 
on February 28, 2014, http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1510(2003), 2. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Data collected by author according to Deutscher Bundestag. Refer to the bibliography: Drucksache 
14/7930, Drs. 14/9246, Drs. 14/9246, Drs. 15/128, Drs. 15/128, Drs. 15/1700, Drs. 15/1880, Drs. 15/37, 
Drs. 15/3710, Drs. 15/3710, Drs. 15/5996, Drs. 16/10473, Drs. 16/14157, Drs. 16/2573, Drs. 16/6460, Drs. 
17/11685, Drs. 17/11685, Drs. 17/39, Drs. 17/4402, Drs. 17/4402, Drs. 17/654, Drs. 17/8166, Drs. 17/8166, 
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Berlin’s decision to expand its troop contribution relied on the first Afghanistan 
concept formulated in 2003 by leading officials of the Ministry of the Interior, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defense, and Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development.165 This inter-ministerial cooperation coordinated and harmonized efforts 
in state matters of police forces, institutions, infrastructure, and safety within the area of 
responsibility (AOR) of each Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT). With the use of 
PRT, the German government’s intention was to establish self-sustaining “islands of 
security”166 that spread a “feeling of security through visibility” promoting a 
democratization dynamic in Afghanistan.167 “Developing without security is 
unachievable, and security without development is meaningless” was the proclaimed key 
idea to success.168 The PRT mission objective was to “assist the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and 
secure environment … to enable Security Sector Reform and reconstruction efforts.”169 
Thus, the focus of the PRT mission was––with respect to ISAF soldiers––to step into an 
assisting and empowering role solely.  
The U.S. implementation of the PRT concept, however, focused more on military 
aspects and aimed to show military force of detached units across the AOR that are part 
of the local communities, actively cooperate with the local population, and build up trust 
among the local population, and thus gather human intelligence.170 In short, both 
approaches demanded military presence relying on a different rationale. The German 
165 Gerd Brandstetter, “Nation Building in Afghanistan: The German Provincial Reconstruction Team 
Concept: Means to Improve Efficiency of Effort?” (strategy research project, U.S. Army War College, 
2005), 9. 
166 Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 8. 
167 Ibid., 9. 
168 Jan Koehler, „Herausforderungen im Einsatzland: Das PRT Kunduz als Beispiel zivil militärischer 
Intervention,” in Identität, Selbstverständnis, Berufsbild: Implikationen der neuen Einsatzrealität für die 
Bundeswehr, ed. Gerhard Kümmel and Angelika Dörfler-Dierken (Wiesbaden: Springer VS Verlag, 2010), 
77. 
169 “Terms of Reference for CFC and ISAF PRTS In Afghanistan,” in Afghanistan 2005 and Beyond: 
Prospects for Improved Stability Reference Document, ed. Barnett R. Rubin, Humayun Hamidzada, and 
Abby Stoddard (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2005), accessed on March 5, 2014, http://www. 
clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/20050400_cru_ paper_barnett.pdf, 77. 
170 Brandstetter, “Nation Building in Afghanistan,” 6. 
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point of view was clear: Military forces were a necessity to facilitate the PRT tasks, 
radiating a stabilizing effect in the region and guaranteeing freedom of operation for civil 
personnel who promote political, economic, and social development of the Afghan 
people.171 Although the Afghanistan concept was the first German policy document 
addressing a strategy in Afghanistan and providing a general and vague list of goals, it 
lacked clear operationalized objectives and end-state commitments that could be 
addressed with civil or military means.172 First published in 2007, the Afghanistan 
concept––after its revision omitted democratization as an objective in 2006––mirrored its 
inconsequentiality and conceptual shortfall.173 
Besides the implementation of the Afghanistan concept and its idea of a 
comprehensive approach merging military and civilian assets for state building purposes 
using a “civilian reconstruction team with a military protection element,” German politics 
had another reason to expand its contribution in Afghanistan.174 In 2003, Chancellor 
Schröder rejected any participation and support to the United States in the Operation Iraqi 
Freedom and thus Berlin’s administration aimed to temper the moods of its allies by 
intensifying its military contribution in the Northern part of Afghanistan.175 Hence, the 
German government took over ISAF command and as lead-nation with Dutch and Danish 
contingents and further doubled its troops consequently.176 The rationale for ISAF’s 
expansion was to project Afghan Transitional Authority (ATA) beyond Kabul in a four-
171 Antrag der Bundesregierung, “Fortsetzung und Erweiterung der Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher 
Streitkräfte an dem Einsatz einer Internationalen Sicherheitsunterstützungstruppe in Afghanistan auf 
Grundlage der Resolutionen 1386 (2001) vom 20. Dezember 2001, 1413 (2002) vom 23. Mai 2002, 1444 
(2002) vom 27. November 2002 und 1510 (2003) vom 13. Oktober 2003 des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten 
Nationen,” Drs. 15/1700 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003), 3; Brandstetter, “Nation 
Building in Afghanistan,” 10. 
172 Eric Sangar, “The Weight of the Past(s): The Impact of the Bundeswehr’s Use of Historical 
Experience on Strategy-Making in Afghanistan,” Journal of Strategic Studies (London: Routledge Taylor 
& Francis Group, 2013), 4. 
173 Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 10; Michael F. Harsch, “A Reluctant Warrior: The 
German Engagement in Afghanistan,” Peace Research Institute Oslo Paper, accessed on February 27, 2014, 
http://file.prio.no/Publication_files/Prio/Harsch%20(2011)%20A%20Reluctant%20Warrior %20(PRIO-
CMI).pdf, 18. 
174 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 4. 
175 Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 4. 
176 Harsch, “Reluctant Warrior,” 13; Klaus Becher, “German Forces in International Military 
Operations,” in Orbis 48, no. 3 (2004): 398. 
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phased counterclockwise geographical expansion to gain responsibility and control 
throughout Afghanistan.177 While PRT under the OEF mandate were already set up 
between 2002 and 2003 in Afghanistan by American, British, and New Zealand forces 
under the command of the Combined Joint Operations Task Force 180, the German 
military initially took over the control of the U.S.-led PRT in Kunduz in 2003 and built 
an additional PRT in the province of Feyzabad.178  
The German decision to establish PRT in the AOR depended not only on 
relatively secure locations but also on military capabilities to project military forces, 
when needed.179 Thus, Kunduz was selected to house the first German PRT because 
German soldiers had good relations with the local population, German air mobility (e.g., 
MEDEVAC) capabilities were sufficient to cope with the distance, and the AOR seemed 
safer compared to the other areas.180 In the words of General Harald Kujat181 the region 
in and around Kunduz was preferred because “in contrast to the South, the conditions 
there were stable and the prospects for success good. A limited deployment, a calm 
region, no war, but reconstruction; that is something for the Bundeswehr.”182 This 
statement reflects the public and political perceptions on the Afghan conflict but it 
eclipses the operations of the German KSK. While they were conducting warfare under 
the OEF mandate side-by-side with allies, the German ISAF forces began to establish 
177 First, ISAF expanded to the North of Kabul under a German-Dutch command of a German-led 
PRT. The second phase focused on the West and the third phase took control over the South. The control 
over the East was part of phase four with U.S.-led PRT making ISAF’s responsibility to support security 
contiguous and complete throughout the country; Catherine Dale, “War in Afghanistan: Strategy, 
Operations, and Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, accessed on February 27, 2014, 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40156.pdf, 23. 
178 Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 7; Brandstetter, “Nation Building in Afghanistan,” 7. 
179 Brandstetter, “Nation Building in Afghanistan,” 8. 
180 Ibid., 8‒9; Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 9. 
181 German four-star General Harald Kujat was Chairman of the NATO Military Committee during 
this time. 
182 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 4. 
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PRT with an emphasis on trust building and on social development in the Northern part 
of Afghanistan.183  
Since 2006, Afghanistan has been divided in and managed by four Regional 
Commands (RC) and the German military commands RC North, which is established in 
Mazar-e-Sharif.184 At that time, 450 soldiers were mandated for the PRT Kunduz mission 
and less than a fifth were infantry soldiers to fulfill the assistant role of a PRT-embedded 
military protection element “in an area of the size of Slovenia with about 1.8 million 
inhabitants.”185 The initial strategic shortfall of the Afghanistan concept combined with 
an unwinnable military upper hand for show of force to conduct peacekeeping operations 
in Afghanistan shed light on the lacking prerequisites of the ATA to gain influence and 
control in the area beyond Kabul.186 Thus, the local support for the ATA and for German 
ISAF soldiers gradually diminished in the AOR and the operational environment became 
unstable and hostile progressively.  
Although Germany was the first ISAF participating nation that marshaled 
peacekeeping operations beyond Kabul, the German military focused its strategy on two 
PRT, combining civil and military means (i.e., comprehensive approach) to rebuild social 
infrastructure in the Northern region, whereas German soldiers protected the civil 
development and passively stabilized the AOR. In other words, Germany’s chosen 
comprehensive approach allowed political and military officials to highlight the nation 
building and peacekeeping side of Germany’s contribution in Afghanistan, distracting 
183 Patricia Schneider, “Terrorismusbekämpfung als Einsatzfeld für die Bundeswehr? Eine Pro-und-
Kontra-Diskussion,” in Armee im Einsatz: Grundlagen, Strategien und Ergebnisse einer Beteiligung der 
Bundeswehr, ed. Armin Wagner and Hans J. Gießmann (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2009), 260‒1. 
184 King, Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces, 43. 
185 Antrag der Bundesregierung, “Fortsetzung und Erweiterung der Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher 
Streitkräfte an dem Einsatz einer Internationalen Sicherheitsunterstützungstruppe in Afghanistan auf 
Grundlage der Resolutionen 1386 (2001) vom 20. Dezember 2001, 1413 (2002) vom 23. Mai 2002, 1444 
(2002) vom 27. November 2002 und 1510 (2003) vom 13. Oktober 2003 des Sicherheitsrats der Vereinten 
Nationen,” Drs. 15/1700 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003), 2; Harsch, “Reluctant 
Warrior,” 15. 
186 Brandstetter, “Nation Building in Afghanistan,” 4. 
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from the conventional war in the South and portraying the ISAF mission less 
militarily.187  
B. GERMAN MILITARY IMPLICATIONS 
A close look at the German military implications sheds light on two prominent 
factors. First, Berlin’s contribution to ISAF was, in terms of military forces, financial 
cost, and duration, the biggest military, economic, and political involvement of Germany. 
Second, Berlin commanded the third largest ISAF contingent in Afghanistan.188 From 
2002 until 2006, German soldiering to enforce the UN mandate and thus to enable the 
ATA to fulfill their government duties reflected two main principles. On one side, Berlin 
focused on the civil dimension in the Afghanistan conflict and kept the military part in 
the background. On the other, Berlin emphasized a defensive risk minimization approach 
to keep German soldiers out of danger and away from hostile fire.189  
The contrast to the American course of action and their locations of PRT serves as 
one example. While German PRT were located in secure areas embedded in pro-ISAF 
communities to build up civil architecture and to promote social development, U.S.-led 
PRT were often used as Forward Operating Bases that were located in hostile areas to 
conduct military operations and to keep close contact with those communities.190 In other 
words, Berlin’s chosen path to project military force was of a defensive nature to sell the 
image of a peacekeeping rather than an occupying force.191  
This image went hand-in-hand with German military restrictions––national 
caveats––that expressed the operational translation of Berlin’s defensive risk 
minimization approach. Germany’s record of coalition governments and very close 
political supervision over the Bundeswehr combined with a weak parliament to politicize 
187 Thomas Rid and Martin Zapfe, “Mission Command without Mission: German Military Adaptation 
in Afghanistan,” in Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, ed. Theo Farrell, Frans Osinga and James A 
Russell (California: Stanford University Press, 2013), 201‒2. 
188 Theo Farrell, “Military Adaptation in Afghanistan, The Editor’s Response” in International 
Politics Reviews 1 (2013): 112; Rid and Zapfe, “Mission Command without Mission,” 193. 
189 Harsch, “Reluctant Warrior,” 11. 
190 Ibid., 13‒15. 
191 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 5. 
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and problematize any military engagement.192 The response was a comprehensive set of 
constraints. Hence, the German caveats for ISAF operations set strict limits to use force 
for self-defense only and restrained German military forces to a purely defensive and 
passive nature.193 The caveats limited not only freedom of action in military operations 
but also hindered trust building with the population and progress to empower the ATA in 
the AOR.194 Other ISAF participating nations used national caveats as well, but German 
operational restrictions were extraordinarily restrictive, which during the Afghan conflict 
were progressively criticized by the other ISAF participating countries.195  
Despite German expansion in the Northern part of Afghanistan, German troops 
and operations were regionally confined in and around Kabul. National engagement was 
neither allowed to permanently support allied partners in other RCs nor to assist the ATA 
to enforce its authority when operations were outside of the RC North.196 Additionally, 
German ISAF troops were strictly cut off from any OEF engagements to portray a clean 
ISAF image and to avoid escalating military involvements.197 Berlin’s strategy had a 
clear point: OEF troops fought terrorism and ISAF troops stimulated nation building;198 
even though, both troops were operating in the same areas among local communities 
whose people could not differentiate between different troops and their tasks. Precisely, 
while OEF soldiers used target lists to capture or kill terrorists within the same AOR, 
German forces had to follow restrictive regulations that “prohibited German troops’ use 
of lethal force unless an attack was in process or imminent,” including a ban to fire on 
retreating identified adversaries.199  
192 King, Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces, 238. 
193 Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 10. 
194 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 7. 
195 Rid and Zapfe, “Mission Command without Mission,” 203; Auerswald and Saideman, NATO in 
Afghanistan, 71‒3. 
196 Harsch, “Reluctant Warrior,” 14. 
197 Ibid. 
198 Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 6. 
199 Harsch, “Reluctant Warrior,” 14. 
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In sum, Berlin’s decision to use its military forces was based on a neutral, passive, 
and defensive nature to avoid any potential conflict that could risk German soldiers “of 
being harmed or of harming others.”200 Even after the suicide attack on a crowed 
marketplace in the center of Kunduz that killed three German soldiers in 2007, these 
strict restrictions remained unchanged.201  
In the beginning of peacekeeping in the RC North, German soldiers conducted 
patrols in lightly unarmored vehicles, showed military force in well-known areas and 
communities, gathered human intelligence on the general security situation, and selected 
potential locations for infrastructural improvements and social development projects.202 
Thereby, German soldiers identified local power-holders (key leaders) who were used as 
points of contact to address security and social issues.203 Key leader engagements 
allowed information exchange in return for civil projects and funds for construction 
initiated by the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.204 Schools, 
churches, wells, and other infrastructure were built that consequently portrayed German 
ISAF soldiers as “aid workers in uniform” in the medial realm.205  
The close contact not only provided the German military with vital intelligence 
but also promoted trust within the local communities. Rightly, close contact with the 
population is understood as a way to reduce security threats.206 Close contact with 
communities far off PRT, however, was no option for German soldiers because caveats 
prohibited overnight operations.207 A lack of sufficiently protected vehicles further 
complicated showing military presence and footprint in the AOR.208 Additionally, 
200 Harsch, “Reluctant Warrior,” 14. 
201 Auerswald and Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan, 73. 
202 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s), 5. 
203 Philipp Münch, “Freund oder Feind? Zur Einschätzung von Sicherheitsbedrohungen in 
Friedensmissionen am Beispiel der Bundeswehr in Afghanistan,” Universität Hamburg Arbeitspapier 4 
(Hamburg: Institut für Politikwissenschaft, 2009), 51. 
204 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 5. 
205 Ibid., 7. 
206 Münch, “Freund oder Feind?,” 51. 
207 Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 9. 
208 Kuehne, “German and U.S.-led provincial reconstruction teams,” 98. 
 56 
                                                 
limited air mobility capacities hindered long-range projection of military force that left 
some regions without ISAF influence and control.209 
Since 2003, the general security situation in RC North had deteriorated gradually, 
and the level of violence against pro-ISAF civilians and against ISAF soldiers thrived. 
The increase in suicide attacks, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, and rocket 
attacks on the PRT mirrored the security decline during that time.210 Although the 
favorable situation in and around Kabul was compared to the other parts of Afghanistan 
as relatively safer, insurgents211 slowly infiltrated the local communities, regained 
influence, and spread violence and terror.212 Berlin’s rationale to use a neutral, passive, 
and defensive approach resulted in losing the support and trust of the local communities 
and in losing sight of the armed conflict that slowly emerged at the AOR’s periphery and 
steadily spread into the PRT’s vicinity.213 While the insurgents had avoided openly 
attacking German soldiers since the German ISAF expansion, insurgents’ tactics started 
to change in 2006 when Bundeswehr forces were frequently and openly fired at.214  
This change of warfare not only shed light on the worsened security situation but 
also on spreading insurgent control over local communities. Berlin answered the 
emerging insurgents and growing attacks with increased force protection. According to 
Minister of Defense Dr. Jung’s directive, German military patrols were allowed with 
209 In the RC North, six CH-53 GS helicopters were stationed in Mazar-e-Sharif for transport and 
personnel recovery operations; Rid and Zapfe, “Mission Command without Mission,” 202‒3. 
210 Thomas Wiegold, “Es begann als ‘Insel der Stabilität:’ Zehn Jahre Bundeswehr in Kunduz,” 
Augen geradeaus, accessed on February 27, 2014, http:// augengeradeaus.net/2013/10/kundus-zehn-jahre-
bundeswehr/, 10. 
211 Mainly Taliban and other radical Islamic factions (al-Qaida, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, Islamic 
Movement of Uzbekistan); Guido Steinberg and Nils Wörner, “Eskalation im Raum Kunduz - Wer sind die 
Aufständischen in Nordafghanistan?” SWP-Aktuell 84 (Berlin: German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs, 2010), 4‒6; Steinhoff, “Determinants and politics of German military transformation,” 
127. 
212 Boris Wilke, “Wie weiter in Afghanistan? Regionale Wiederaufbauteams als möglicher Einstieg in 
ein größeres internationales Engagement,” SWP-Aktuell 33 (Berlin: German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs, 2003), 2. 
213 Florian Stöhr, “Politische und gesellschaftliche Rahmenbedingungen deutscher 
Auslandsmissionen am Beispiel Afghanistan,” in Auftrag Auslandseinsatz: Neueste Militärgeschichte an 
der Schnittstelle von Geschichtswissenschaft, Politik, Öffentlichkeit und Streitkräften, ed. Bernhard Chiari 
(Berlin: Rombach Verlag, 2012), 223. 
214 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 8. 
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armored vehicles at pre-planned times only and for some patrols German soldiers had to 
stay within these armored vehicles; cutting off contact with the Afghan people 
entirely.215 Consequently, the show of military presence in the AOR further decreased. In 
other words, Berlin decided that force protection prevailed over the ISAF mission. While 
military presence and visibility of German ISAF soldiers diminished in the public realm, 
cooperation with and ties to key leaders and local people were out of reach, and the 
influence of insurgents further thrived and the level of violence escalated consequently. 
C. GERMAN MILITARY CONSTRAINTS AND CHALLENGES 
The shifting situation since 2003 in and around Kabul challenged German soldiers 
in two ways. First, the mission changed profoundly over time from a peacekeeping 
mission in a stable and relatively safe environment to a combat mission against 
insurgents, which confronted ISAF forces with escalating hostilities. Second, the daily 
situation and confrontations were extremely diverse and thus demanded civil and military 
sets of skills to cope with fast changing social dynamics. While Berlin’s approach at the 
strategic level relied on risk minimization with restrictive caveats to avoid any 
confrontation, the soldiers at the tactical level had to adapt to the local operational 
environments with paradoxical demands that initiated “a protracted process of military 
adaptation and learning.”216 Berlin did not want a military image and eclipsed the 
traditional skills of soldiering to promote a peacekeeping image. Admittedly, the 
traditional skills of soldiering had been long abandoned before the Afghan conflict and it 
was clear that not fighting but peacekeeping, saving, mediating, and helping were 
required to succeed in contemporary missions.217 The Afghan conflict, however, showed 
that these new sets of requirements posed challenges for the German military that 
affected both the tactical and the strategic level directly. 
  
215 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 8; Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 11. 
216 Warburg, “Paradoxe Anforderungen,” 57; Harsch, “Reluctant Warrior,” 17. 
217 Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “Innere Führung und der Wandel des Kriegsbildes,” Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte 48 (2009): 29. 
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Keeping in mind that the ISAF mandate defined an enabling and assisting role of 
ISAF soldiers, the enforcement of ATA influence and control relied on the Afghan 
National Police (ANP) and the Afghan National Army (ANA)––which hardly existed.218 
Following the logic of the ISAF mandate, member forces did not stand in the first line 
while they supported ANA and ANP forces conducting their missions. The tactical 
scenario presented a “second row approach” that put ANA and ANP forces executing 
missions while ISAF forces could intervene if mission success was jeopardized.219 The 
rationale behind the second row approach was to legitimize the Afghan government and 
its security forces and to avoid an occupier image of the ISAF forces.  
The second row approach, however, faced serious problems when Afghan 
communities did not accept Kabul’s leaders and when compromised individuals of 
Afghan security forces turned around and opened fire at German ISAF soldiers. 
Additionally, German caveats prohibited offensive direct intervention, and the second 
row approach resulted in force protection rather than in enforcement of ANA and ANP 
mission goals. This situation was further complicated because other ISAF soldiers had 
less restrictive caveats that not only sold German ISAF soldiers down the river—
compared to their ISAF partners—but also aroused desires on the German military 
side.220 The different military approaches were well known by ISAF commanders. An 
ISAF commander compared British and German military forces stating: “You ask a UK 
company to break into a house they will do so. A German company, they will not. 
Germany will not change. Some nations do not want non-national responsibility.”221 Key 
Afghan leaders were aware of this difference as well and criticized the lack of support of 
German ISAF forces for local communities by fighting off terror from insurgents. 
According to the district governor of Kunduz, the German lines of command had to be 
blessed by the Command in Mazar-e-Sharif that took too long and in the end military 
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help was a long time coming.222 Hence, Berlin’s strategic decision to stay in the 
background––second row––and to avoid high-intensity warfare constrained German 
military professionalism at the tactical level. This decision resulted in criticism on 
disparate “risk-sharing” from other ISAF contributing nations such as the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Canada.223 
German ISAF soldiers faced another dilemma that differed in intensity and 
quality from other missions abroad. Although German caveats were extraordinarily 
restrictive, the need to combine fighting and protector skills was clear. The ISAF soldiers 
were confronted with a situation that fused peacekeeping with armed conflicts close to 
war.224 While one moment required neglecting force protection to build up trust in the 
local situation, a moment later demanded asking for joint fire support to guarantee the 
survival of ISAF forces and of Afghan people. Certainly, the combination of aggressor 
and protector skills was nothing new in MOOTW, but those operations required 
additional skills outside the military domain.  
The necessary addition of diverse professional skills to traditional military skills 
put modern military professionalism to the test. This “functional extension” demands 
non-traditional military skills that are part of the civilian realm.225 As UN Secretary-
General Hammarskjöld famously noted, “Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only 
soldiers can do it.”226 Modern military professionalism requires additional skills that 
belong to other professional domains such as police forces, diplomacy, mediation, and 
cultural expertise.227 The situation in the field and the national interest matter and dictate 
what skill is needed at what time and place to be successful. This is one of the reasons 
why the German White Paper still highlights German military professionalism that 
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demands both military expertise and knowledge of “political, humanitarian, economic, 
and cultural aspects.”228 Therefore, the genuine traditional military skill to conduct 
warfare was placed on the same level with other professional skills because the interplay 
of different skills or the dominance of one particular skill might be the deciding factor for 
tactical or strategic success.  
The operational environment in the Northern part of Afghanistan presented this 
paradoxical image of fast shifting––sometimes opposing––functional demands that 
stressed the flexibility and capability of German ISAF forces.229 While the German 
military was acquainted with the course of events and their challenges from peacekeeping 
missions that mostly relied on de-escalating rather than proactive, kinetic actions, 
German soldiers had neither the government backup and permission nor the specialized 
training to conduct the required kinetic and counterinsurgency operations.230 On one 
side, German soldiers were in the focus with police-like, humanitarian skills; on the 
other, they stood hampered by national caveats on the sideline––such as “neutral 
referees”––when traditional military skills were required.231 Hence, the confrontation 
with paradoxical demands and the functional extension of the military professionalism 
were the first steps toward an operational German military that was not ready to be fully 
involved in high-intensity warfare including counterinsurgency tactics. 
D. CONCLUSION: MILES PROTECTOR IN PEACEKEEPING 
OPERATIONS 
The analysis of the German expansion of the ISAF mandate reveals that political 
decisions diverged from the changing operational environment that confronted the 
military at the tactical level. In a top-down procedure, Berlin assigned no merit to 
fighting and set strict directives to promote a public-likable peacekeeping image by 
avoiding any escalation and any German military involvement in armed conflicts. Thus, 
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Germany chose a risk minimization approach that forced its soldiers to step into a neutral, 
passive, and defensive role posing paradoxical demands to military professionalism. 
Thus, the functional extension started to alter the heart and brains of the German military 
itself and to challenge core concepts of command and leadership in the Bundeswehr. The 
military dynamics in the RC North increased in complexity and the political supervision 
intensified––being perceived to equal a micromanagement command directly from 
Berlin––that called the principles of Innere Führung into question.232 While the core of 
Innere Führung demands that German soldiers in general and military leaders in 
particular be self-determined and self-confident and to proactively and dynamically 
engage in missions, Berlin’s strategic approach imposed a freezing effect on the German 
military professionalism and on the cultural foundation of the Bundeswehr.233 
The initial unknown and unexpected operational demands in the RC North tested 
not only the soldiers in the field but also the culture of the Bundeswehr. The paradoxical 
requirements and functional extension resulted in thinking about military 
professionalism, viewing the soldiers’ role as a miles protector that goes hand-in-hand 
with Baudissin’s citizen in uniform. The term miles protector—first coined by Swiss 
General Gustav Däniker—fuses traditional military skills with new operational demands. 
Combat skills and non-traditional military skills such as those required by diplomats, 
mediators, and cultural experts are equally important for mission success. The miles 
protector is understood as a post-Cold War soldier who masters the complexity of new 
armed conflicts by embodying a broad set of skills and knowledge.234 Certainly, the 
operational advantage is that additional skills and knowledge extend the capacity for 
additional options of perceptions and actions to solve complex situations of armed 
conflicts, even when confronting different cultures.235  
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The German White Paper 2006––three years after German soldiers were 
conducting patrols in the RC North––argues that “besides being combatants, the 
servicemen and women in the new Bundeswehr are at the same time helpers, protectors, 
and mediators. This job profile calls for analytical and action-taking capabilities that go 
far beyond purely military needs.”236 Those capabilities require modern soldiers who 
possess political, religious, and ethical education in general and cross-cultural training in 
particular to cope with paradoxical demands in fast changing operational environments 
far off the homeland with a differently socialized populace that might not be understood 
in familiar terms of thought. Thus, mastery and concurrence of capabilities beyond 
traditional military skills are necessary for soldiers’ understanding and confidence in their 
actions. This circumstance forced a military adaptation at the tactical level that slowly 
changed Berlin’s perception of soldiering in complex conflicts. 
The political and military awareness of the importance of “capabilities that go far 
beyond purely military needs”237 emerged gradually when German ISAF forces 
expanded their mission beyond Kabul. While the complexity of the ISAF mission 
increased and included fast changing tasks that required humanitarian helpers as well as 
political and social mediators, the general security situation, moreover, deteriorated and 
required protectors and fighters progressively. Interestingly, protection of the Afghan 
people with military means on the ground was not part of the German mandate until 
2009.238 With respect to Berlin’s chosen strategy toward military intervention in the 
Northern part of Afghanistan, the German soldiers were yet not ready to comply with the 
latter job profiles. After 2009, Germany’s strategy, however, changed and a shift in 
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focusing on helper and mediator tasks to protector and fighter profiles emerged, partly 
eclipsing miles protector and bringing miles bellicus to the fore.  
 64 
V. FIGHTING, ARMED CONFLICT, AND WAR 
War is an act of violence to compel our adversary to fulfill our will.239 
–Carl von Clausewitz 
 
After the initial military defeat in 2001, the Taliban forces evaded capture but 
steadily increased their forces and progressively filled the security vacuum with shadow 
governments across Afghanistan.240 The expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul with the use 
of PRT established the physical presence of military force in communities that improved 
the general security situation and interlocked peacekeeping with the Afghan population. 
This approach initially hindered Taliban influence and protracted their control over the 
local population in the beginning of the Taliban insurrection. Since 2006, the ISAF 
mission evolved from a peacekeeping mission with the focus on security and stabilization 
of Afghanistan to a mission with the focus on fighting insurgents such as Taliban, 
Haqqani Network, Hezb-i-Islami, foreign fighters, various tribes in Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, and criminal networks profiting from the narcotics trade.241 The intensification 
of U.S. deployment in Southern Afghanistan and, therefore, more offensive operations 
pushed insurgents to the RC North that was relatively free of military presence and safe 
for insurgents, and consequently increasing attacks on the German military.242  
Since then, the political and strategic disjunction between the ISAF and the OEF 
mission has been hardly upheld because the tasks and mission goal became mainly 
congruent.243 The German military adaptation to the social developments and to the 
change of the ISAF mission demanded a different and unknown military approach. In 
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2006, the Spiegel Magazine printed a cover picture with the title, “The Germans must 
learn to kill,” which called attention to the seriousness and the controversy in political 
and social debates in Germany.244  
The difference in the operational environment and in the shift of the mission from 
peacekeeping to combat operations was significantly dramatic by comparing the situation 
in 2003 and 2010. While in 2003 fewer than 2,000 German soldiers were involved in 
peacekeeping operations using unarmored and unprotected vehicles and were portrayed 
as “aid workers in uniform” to build up a devastated country, the operational environment 
in 2010 was not only far more hostile toward German soldiers but also more than 5,300 
German soldiers conducted offensive operations using armored and protected vehicles, 
heavy German howitzers were stationed in Kabul, unmanned air vehicles were observing 
the country, and infantry maneuvering forces were fighting insurgents in Northern 
Afghanistan.245 Additionally, the defense budget between 2005 and 2010 increased by 
7.6 billion Euros; this was the first time since the defense budget progressively ran from 
3.2 percent of the German gross domestic product (GDP) in 1975, down to 1.05 percent 
of GDP in 2005, and up to 1.25 percent of GDP in 2010.246  
Another striking difference illustrated the change of investigations initiated by the 
Federal Prosecutor General. In 2008, a German soldier was repatriated and investigated 
by public attorneys because he opened fire and killed three Afghan people after using 
warning shots according to the Rules of Engagements (ROE) on an approaching Afghan 
car that was assumed to be a vehicle borne IED.247 Two years later, in 2010, German 
soldiers conducted offensive operations—also relying on ROE—in areas of Kunduz and 
Baghlan, thereby killing hundreds of insurgents. To the contrary, two German soldiers 
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were awarded with the cross of bravery and nobody was sent home and investigated by 
attorneys.248 
Since 2006, ISAF participating countries had started to openly criticize the 
passive and defensive posture of the German security policy toward Afghanistan and 
demanded more contribution in offensive operations in order to successfully confront the 
spread of insurgents across Afghanistan with military means.249 After long debates in the 
Bundestag, the parliament decided to deploy six tactical aircraft with reconnaissance 
equipment (Tornado RECCE) and quick infantry maneuvering forces––Quick Reaction 
Forces (QRF)––to the RC North.250 Thus, it was the pressure by the allies rather than a 
political assessment or a strategic decision that accelerated Germany’s military offensive 
participation, eclipsing the risk minimization approach gradually.251 This intensification 
of a military approach was controversial and contested between the politicians in the 
different rows of the Bundestag. The demand of one member of the parliament to 
“promise … that they [i.e., infantry] won’t shoot once they’re down there” questioned the 
understanding and awareness of the military dynamic of the Afghan conflict and the 
necessity to shift from a passive to an active Afghanistan security strategy.252  
Furthermore, one has to keep in mind that the Tornado RECCE were prohibited to 
engage in close air support (CAS) and were employed for reconnaissance purposes 
solely, prohibiting any share of INTEL for joint targeting purposes.253 Thus, the 
Bundestag was yet not willing to engage in offensive operations like their allies in the 
adjacent RC. Also, a letter from U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Michael Gates to the 
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German Minister of Defense Dr. Jung in 2008 demanding a stronger commitment with 
more forces, additional helicopters, and loosened caveats did not alter Berlin’s decision to 
stay in the second row.254  
Certainly, Berlin’s decision and its troops were in the spotlight because Germany 
commanded the third largest contingent and its forces had a good reputation for being 
very proficient.255 The Bundestag-imposed caveats, however, impacted German 
operations in Afghanistan and the course of events in the Afghan conflict, including the 
deterioration the security situation since 2003, and considerably spoiled the 
Bundeswehr’s reputation among its Western allies. As the Spiegel Magazine stated, “the 
Germans might as well stay at home. [ … ] Germany has acquired the reputation of a 
discredited nation, a nation incapable of waging war, a cowardly nation.”256 The 
operational demand and tone by German allies shifted progressively demanding of Berlin 
a stronger commitment with military forces in Afghanistan that found its political peak at 
the Munich Conference on Security Policy when U.S. Secretary of Defense Gates openly 
argued that “at the same time, in NATO, some allies ought not to have the luxury of 
opting only for stability and civilian operations, thus forcing other Allies to bear a 
disproportionate share of the fighting and the dying.”257  
Undoubtedly, the addressee of Gate’s statement was clear to all participants of the 
conference. In 2009, Minister of Defense Karl-Theodor Freiherr zu Guttenberg demanded 
more support from the German parliament as well and started a political outrage when he 
highlighted in a speech in front of the Bundestag that he shared the soldiers’ perception 
of a warlike situation in and around Kunduz.258 In the same year, the Bundestag 
254 Giegerich, “NATO im Einsatz,” 72. 
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mandated additional troops to Afghanistan and loosened the restrictive caveats that paved 
the way for more military freedom of action, including active participation with allies and 
the conduct of high-intensity offensive operations in the RC North.259 
A. SECURITY DECLINE: ADAPTATION OF THE BUNDESWEHR 
Since 2006, a series of coordinated insurgent attacks against Afghan communities, 
military and police facilities, and ISAF soldiers and installations increased alarmingly. 
The suicide attack on a crowed marketplace in May 2007 serves as one example of the 
spiral of violence.260 Since the beginning of Germany’s contribution to ISAF, 55 German 
soldiers died in Afghanistan, 35 were killed in action; 15 German soldiers during the first 
six years and another 23 between 2007 and 2011.261 The insurgency spread from the 
South and East through the districts into the Northern part of Afghanistan and the 
German military was increasingly confronted with guerrilla warlike combat situations 
resulting in a rising number of wounded and killed ISAF soldiers.262 When the IED 
attacks against German forces “almost doubled within a year, from 27 in 2007 to 44 in 
2008,” the initial belief in a peacekeeping mission changed not only at the tactical level 
but also in Berlin.263  
Germany responded to the emergence of a spiral of violence in the RC North with 
increased force protection in the tactical sphere. German commanders notably changed 
the quantity and quality of military patrols. German ISAF soldiers conducted far fewer 
patrols in and around Kabul between 2006 and 2008, and Minister of Defense Dr. Jung 
prohibited any patrol activities with unarmored vehicles––or operating outside armored 
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vehicles in most cases.264 Consequently, the German military presence partly diminished 
in the RC North and close contact with local communities and their leaders was 
jeopardized. While the military presence and its projection of force in the RC North 
faded, violence further spread and insurgents’ activities altered from guerrilla like 
tactics––hit-and-run––to open attacks that not only increased fatalities on ISAF forces but 
also eroded Berlin’s will for an active approach toward the Afghanistan conflict.265 
After the most severe of several assaults on the crowded marketplace in the center 
of Kunduz in May 2007, only the small Task Force 47––German KSK––continued to 
covertly conduct operations outside Kabul and the strong footprint of German forces 
initially fell back into the well-protected ISAF bases.266 As one development worker 
explained, the ISAF soldiers were “locking the door from the inside.”267 Force protection 
prevailed in the ISAF mission and more than 3,000 soldiers of the German contingent 
were disconnected from the populace, neglecting the center of gravity of any 
counterinsurgency (COIN) tactic.268 Certainly to this point of time, the Bundeswehr and 
the German government were still far from understanding and conducting COIN 
tactics.269 Only 10 percent of the German contingent was involved in operations beyond 
the fence of the ISAF bases and thus only a minority passed the main gate to conduct 
operations to provide security and gain the trust of the local population during their four- 
or six-month deployments.270 This already small faction of operational units reduced 
their presence in the field and the emphasis on self and force protection eclipsed security 
264 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 8; Wiegold, “Es begann als ‘Insel der Stabilität,’” 9. 
265 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 8. 
266 Wiegold, “Es begann als ‘Insel der Stabilität,’” 9; Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 11; 
Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 9. 
267 Merz, “Still on the way to Afghanistan?” 11. 
268 Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Oxford: Osprey 
Publishing, 2008), 14‒5; Robert Taber, War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare (Dulles, 
Virginia: Potomac Books, 2002), 11‒2. 
269 The Army Staff (FüH III 2) wrote the first conceptual paper on COIN in 2009; Chiari, “Krieg als 
Reise?” 26; Rid and Zapfe, “Mission Command without Mission,” 199. 
270 King, Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces, 286; King, “Adaptation or Refusal to Adapt,” 
102. 
 70 
                                                 
and trust building temporarily, which cost them situational awareness, INTEL oversight, 
and opportunities “to secure and win over the local population.”271  
Two statements by senior staff officers presented a clear picture of the situation at 
the tactical level at that time. First, the former German PRT Kunduz commander in 2008 
portrayed his impressions and argued, “my predecessor concentrated his forces ... 
because the base was being fired upon with missiles on a daily basis; he then desperately 
tightened all forces to protect himself against the missiles and thus lost sight of the fact 
that one has to be present in 60 kilometers, in 120 kilometers of distance. In those places 
where we were not present, oh wonder, the Taliban gained a foothold.”272 Second, 
former advisor to General Stanley Allen McChrystal––ISAF commander––reported his 
“submarine-like” impressions of the German military approach in the RC North  
[T]he experience of traveling around Mazar-e-Sharif [ … ] in an armored 
German vehicle, whereby I could only observe Mazar and the Afghans 
themselves through a narrow two inch by four inch slit of bullet-proof 
glass, really bothered me. It was ... as if I was seeing Afghanistan through 
a periscope. And if this was how most German soldiers were seeing 
Afghanistan, I had no confidence that any of them really understood what 
was going on in Northern Afghanistan at a time when the provinces under 
German responsibility were noticeably worsening.273  
Conversely, these statements illustrated the constraints of German military 
engagements, and showed, on the other, the uncomfortable situation the soldiers were 
confronted with in the tactical sphere. Furthermore, not only was the German military 
clearly ordered to avoid casualties but were they also directly tied to Berlin’s “operational 
and tactical micromanagement” setting strict rules and constraints for any German 
operations at the tactical level that left no doubt about Berlin’s lacking political will to 
engage in an offensive approach.274 In short, the ISAF mission and COIN principles and 
tactics––apparently unknown to this point from the strategic down to the tactical level––
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were neglected for fear of own casualties.275 Despite a spiral of violence in the RC North 
since 2005, Berlin’s focus to avoid German military deaths in the fields and to portray the 
peacekeeping and stabilization nature of the Afghan mission went hand-in-hand with 
neglecting COIN principles and tactics because “successful COIN requires acceptance of 
risks,” which Berlin was not willing to take.276  
Consequently, two aspects should be highlighted. First, Berlin’s close political 
and risk-averse supervision limited the military freedom of action for German 
commanders and soldiers in the operational and tactical sphere. Trust in and 
independence of commanding officers, which is the core aspect of Innere Führung, was 
thereby even lost to the first line of troopers that seriously weakened the Bundeswehr’s 
effectiveness overall. Second, the German military initially lacked military equipment––
improved body armor, armored carriers and vehicles, and air mobility. That progressively 
pushed demand but re-equipment of the Afghan contingent was meeting the crucial 
demand only slowly.277 Thus, the German military not only started with significant 
constraints that reduced its effectiveness in the field, but also Berlin’s reluctance to 
amend its politics to reflect the realities at the operational and tactical level delayed vital 
military needs of operational freedom with its required equipment.  
One has to keep in mind that the Bundeswehr with respect to human and material 
factors is––among NATO partners––commonly viewed as the best army in Europe.278 
First, German military industries, which equip the German military, rank next to the U.S. 
forces as the lead in NATO. Second, German military personnel are known for their 
excellent education and military training, as is widely acknowledged and certified by 
NATO.279 Third, Germany has the lead in the European economy and politics and thus 
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generally has the means to equip its forces best. Germany’s ISAF involvement, however, 
greatly damaged Germany’s reputation for possessing a very capable military and “the 
Bundeswehr is now accused of becoming professionally disorientated, lacking military 
leadership and is viewed with dismay by many British officers.”280 As Anthony King 
cites a British officer recounting, “Think of Germany. We used to admire them. They had 
great kit. Their senior officers in the Bundeswehr in early days were still from the 
German military caste, with experience or fathers with experience in the Wehrmacht and 
with grandfathers who fought in World War I. But that has gone, they have become 
almost pacifist. They are flailing around.”281 
Against the background of these statements and security issues at the operational 
and tactical level, the adaptation of the Bundeswehr changed noticeably in the military 
realm and emerged from bottom-up influencing the political-strategic level after 2007 for 
several reasons.282 On one side, the U.S. surge was not confined to the Southern and 
Eastern part of Afghanistan but also a significant military growth of U.S. personnel and 
equipment occurred in the RC North.283 Additionally, a U.S. general with extensive 
military insight including Special Forces experience was assigned next to the German RC 
North commander to push for military success and to put an end to thriving insurgency 
with more personnel and capabilities.284  
On the other, German military reports emerged from the bottom criticizing the 
deterioration of the general security situation, unavailability of equipment in the ISAF 
contingent, escapist pre-deployment training, the Bundestag’s insufficient force cap, lack 
of political support and information that burgeoned uncertainties among German soldiers, 
and extraordinarily restrictive ROE that all together exerted severe limitations, 
complicated the German military mission, and endangered soldiers’ survival in the 
280 King, Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces, 277‒8. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Rid and Zapfe, “Mission Command without Mission,” 214‒5. 
283 The availability of helicopters increased from 6 German CH-53 (heavy-lift transporters) to over 50 
U.S. helicopters (medium-, and heavy-lift transporters) within a few weeks, not to mention the big jump of 
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284 Rid and Zapfe, “Mission Command without Mission,” 204‒5. 
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end.285 As one Master Sergeant of the PRT Feyzabad argued, “We want to play in the 
Champions League while our soccer shoes do not even meet the standard of a County 
League!”286 Since 2003––and increasingly since 2006––the reports of the 
Wehrbeauftragter (Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces), Reinhold Robbe, 
addressed the deterioration of the general security situation, the necessity to improve 
security means and forces, and linked doubts among German soldiers on the ISAF 
significance to Berlin’s approach toward the Afghan armed conflict.287  
Specifically in 2008 and 2009, Robbe emphasized German military criticism 
pointing at an increasingly worsened security situation and the lack of military equipment 
and personnel.288 As he argued in his report of 2009, “I react now admittedly annoyed 
when soldiers inform me––to this day––on no improvements regarding a sufficient 
number of armored vehicles for infantry units, which had to bear the brunt of heavy 
fighting in Kunduz province.”289 Furthermore, he left no doubt that he had addressed this 
operational and tactical deficit several times. He continued, “In particular, 
incomprehension hit me when official reports on operations attempted to play down the 
escalating number of combat attacks on German patrols to brief exchanges of fire. In fact, 
it was fighting, which lasted several hours mostly,” and he concluded that the 
Bundeswehr neither reacted quickly nor flexibly and thus did not meet its claim to be a 
modern army.290  
A lot of debate in the Bundestag followed that tried to downplay these statements 
and reports; however, German politicians began to speak out and suggested amending the 
285 Unterrichtung durch den Wehrbeauftragten, “Jahresbericht 2006 (48. Bericht),” Drs. 16/4700 
(Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2007); Unterrichtung durch den Wehrbeauftragten, 
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Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2009); Unterrichtung durch den Wehrbeauftragten, “Jahresbericht 
2009 (51. Bericht),” Drs. 17/900 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2010); Auerswald and 
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special remarks on the use of force. Berlin’s politics and approach altered when the 
situation in the RC North had already severely degraded. Precisely, ISAF soldiers were 
confronted with increasing violence and the operational environment mirrored a more 
kinetic nature than formerly known peacekeeping operations. These political and military 
dynamics hit the political scenery in Berlin in full scale and confronted parliamentarians 
with the real threat that German soldiers could be wounded in action, or even get killed in 
action, and most likely kill people on behalf of Germany for mission success.291 The 
debate on Krieg and Gefallene was imminent. 
In spring 2009, Berlin altered the ROE for its deployed soldiers in Afghanistan. 
Not only were the ROE cut from seven down to four pages but also the special remarks 
on the use of force were amended to read, “attacks can be prevented, for example, by 
taking action against individuals who are planning, preparing or supporting attacks, or 
who exhibit other forms of hostile behavior.”292 Germany further decided to deploy 
heavy weapons, three armored-howitzers, and started to conduct offensive and high-
intensity operations side-by-side with ISAF allies, leaving the position of a neutral 
referee and meeting the reality on the ground that had long been demanded by Germany’s 
allies.293 
B. BERLIN’S REVISION: KRIEG AND GEFALLENE 
In the years before 2009, the public and political notion of the Afghanistan 
mission began to change from armed conflict to war. While the Ministry of Defense 
administration under Dr. Jung initially avoided war-related words and signs in public 
communication, he fueled public debates on Krieg (war) and its related term Gefallene 
(fallen soldiers) when he emphasized his gratitude and appreciation for dead soldiers at 
an official funeral service.294 The long-standing political defensive stance toward the 
term Krieg and Gefallene and the highlighted picture of Bundeswehr’s Afghanistan 
291 Auerswald and Saidemann, NATO in Afghanistan, 151. 
292 Ibid. 
293 Ibid., 148; Harsch, “Reluctant Warrior,” 17. 
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mission being of stabilization or reconstruction nature rather than a warlike situation 
followed a coherent political standpoint.295 Dr. Jung’s funeral speech resulted not only 
from a broad debate within the Federal Ministry of Defense but also emerged from the 
extensive amendment of Innere Führung that was adapted to new operational demands 
and military experiences. 
Despite several and substantial changes in the structure and missions of the 
Bundeswehr, the Joint Service Regulation 10/1 on Innere Führung (Leadership 
Development and Civic Education) was not altered for 15 years. The long period of 
validity of the Joint Service Regulation 10/1 from 1993 underlined its importance for the 
Bundeswehr’s corporate culture and it accompanied the organizational changes of the 
German military without being touched by the Federal Ministry of Defense. More 
specifically, those organizational changes were immense and happened in a timeframe of 
less than one generation: the German military shrunk from little less than 500,000 
soldiers––at the collapse of the Warsaw Pact––to 170,000 soldiers with an additional 
15,000 voluntary conscripts,296 the Bundestag abandoned obligatory military 
conscription, the Federal Constitutional Court paved the way for military operations 
around the world in July 1994, the European Court obliged the German executive to 
allow women to access all service areas of the armed forces in 2001, and, above all, the 
German forces had been sent on behalf of Germany on numerous missions abroad, 
bringing real dangers to soldiers’ life and limb. All these crucial developments among 
others forced the Federal Ministry of Defense to amend Innere Führung to the current 
demands of operational forces.  
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While Innere Führung from 1993 described the basic duty of German soldiers to 
loyally serve the Federal Republic of Germany and to bravely defend the rights and 
freedom of the German people under risk of life and limb, the version of 2008 added, 
“military service involves risking life and limb and, in the final analysis, the obligation to 
kill in battle.”297 Additionally, the current Innere Führung was altered to reflect more 
precisely and realistically the operational environments and their conditions than its 
former version and rightly states, “Military service, particularly in command 
assignments, places high demands on the personality of a soldier. The principles of 
Innere Führung provide soldiers with a sound foundation for their actions. After all, 
military missions may require them to kill in battle and to risk their own lives as well as 
the lives of their comrades.”298  
Furthermore, the Joint Service Regulation 10/1 not only provides a catalog of 
military virtues299 to follow but also leaves no doubt about the extensive operational 
demands to “perform different roles at very short notice, even in extreme situations” that 
require “a high degree of ethical competence.”300 This modern comprehension of 
German military professionalism is not confined to the military realm because Innere 
Führung is not intended for official use only but is also available to the public. 
Additionally, it is a novum in the German social and political realm that Innere Führung 
explicitly addresses the burden of and the confrontation with extreme operational 
environments and encountered experiences including the possibility of death in the early 
months of 2008. 
297 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Zentrale Dienstvorschrift 10/1: Innere Führung (Bonn: 
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Innere Führung, Nr. 507. 
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While parliamentarians and the German press continued to debate on the term 
fallen soldiers in Afghanistan,301 Minister of Defense zu Guttenberg, who took over the 
Ministry of Defense in 2009, called the “conflict” a “war” and thus broke a German 
social and political taboo.302 As zu Guttenberg proclaimed, “Without question, there are 
warlike conditions [kriegsähnliche Zustände] in parts of Afghanistan.” Chancellor Dr. 
Angela Merkel added––one year after a German-ordered airstrike in September 2009––in 
a speech in front of the German troops in Kunduz: “We have here not only warlike 
conditions, but you are involved in fighting as it occurs in war.”303  
The Kunduz airstrike of September 2009 was a significant turning point of 
Germany’s involvement in the Afghanistan conflict.304 The shocking incident in the 
vicinity of Kunduz that killed more than one hundred Afghan people shifted the German 
political and public perception of a peacekeeping mission to one of war, changing the 
entire nature of Germany’s further ISAF operations.305 The altered perception and the 
following debate in the Bundestag resulted in a more offensive standpoint that expressed 
Germany’s willingness to project military power with “all necessary measures.”306 The 
Bundestag and the German people had no doubt that the nature of the German 
deployment had become more hostile.307 Consequently, the German caveats were 
loosened to the full extent of the ISAF mandate and reflected the realities on the ground 
301 “Björn Hengst, “Gefallen in Afghanistan: Der Krieg, der nicht Krieg heißen darf,” Spiegel, 
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in Afghanistan: It’s Time for Germans to Talk About War,” Spiegel, updated on April 12, 2010, http:// 
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at the tactical sphere.308 With the turn of 2009, the extensive change of Innere Führung, 
the political and social perception of warlike conditions including contentious debates on 
Krieg and Gefallene, as well as the altered special remarks on the use of force “granted 
the Bundeswehr more resources and tactical autonomy to conduct offensive 
operations.”309 
C. COMBAT INTENSIFIES AND DOMESTIC POLITICS 
By 2008, insurgents dominated large parts of the districts of Baghlan and Kunduz, 
used violence as tool to control the Afghan people, and established a working shadow 
government solidifying their rule of terror throughout the provinces.310 The insurgents 
openly attacked ISAF forces that not only increasingly threatened all foreign 
interventions but also jeopardized the coalition will for the ISAF mission. Since then, 
German soldiers were progressively involved in fighting missions that lasted several 
hours in most instances.311 On Good Friday in 2010, a sophisticated ambush in the 
district of Chahar Darreh hit the heart of the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan.312 The Taliban 
conducted a pre-planned assault killing three German soldiers, wounding five, most of 
them seriously.313 
A comparison between the two Bundestag mandates and their debates in 2008 and 
2010 clarifies the changing German reaction toward thriving insurgency and thus the 
military implications for German soldiering. The mandate in 2008 did not include the 
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protection of the local population as part of the Bundeswehr mission.314 Additionally, the 
military tasks of stabilization, security, protection, and evacuation were mentioned at 
position three in the task ranking.315 The mandate merely referred to the Operational 
Mentoring and Liaison Team (OMLT) as additional forces, hardly mentioning the new 
command over the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) of the RC North.316 The OMLT 
followed the NATO approach for ISAF operations and consisted of small units of ISAF 
soldiers embedded in Afghan battalion-level infantry units.317 OMLT not only supported 
ANA units in training and operations but were also crucial force enablers by providing 
“critical functions such as communicating with artillery, air support, logistics, and other 
NATO assets in the field,” which Afghan security forces lacked.318 Thus, OMLT 
improved ANA’s assertiveness and success in the field directly and promoted the 
credibility and legitimacy of Kabul’s rule.  
In the RC North, Germany used from four to seven OMLT depending on the size 
and structure of the corresponding ANA unit.319 Due to higher combat risks in the RC 
East, West, and South, the German OMLT did not follow their mentored-ANA units 
conducting operations beyond the border of the RC North because Minister of Defense 
Dr. Jung prohibited, with respect to the Bundestag mandate, any German military 
involvement in the other RCs to avoid combat operations, which could risk soldiers’ 
lives.320 While the security situation in the RC North deteriorated, the OMLT mission in 
the RC North gradually shifted, however, from a “supposedly risk-free way to train and 
build up regular Afghan units” to high-intensity combat missions.321 
314 Antrag der Bundesregierung, “Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte an 
dem Einsatz der Internationalen Sicherheitsunterstützungstruppe in Afghanistan (International Security 
Assistance Force, ISAF) unter Führung der NATO auf Grundlage der Resolution 1386 (2001) und 
folgender Resolutionen, zuletzt Resolution 1833 (2008) des Sicherheitsrates der Vereinten Nationen,” Drs. 
16/10473 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger Verlagsgesellschaft, 2008), 2. 
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Additionally, the task for the Quick Reaction Force was transferred from 
Norwegian to German forces in July 2008 according to NATO agreements.322 The 
following Bundestag debate half a year later presented skeptical parliamentarians and a 
Parliamentary State Secretary of Defense who persistently explained the QRF tasks323 
and their necessity for operations in the RC North. He refused an increase of the force 
cap, and emphasized that the quality and nature of German operations did not alter with 
the takeover of the QRF.324  
Interestingly, the fulfillment of the new QRF task assumedly did not require 
additional soldiers, and the assignment of forces to the QRF consequently reduced 
operational personnel in other units. In fact, military personnel were repatriated even 
earlier to meet the Bundestag force cap. Also, QRF’s provision with mechanized infantry 
combat vehicles (MICV) and Dingo 2325 to conduct offensive operations against 
insurgents, together with the ANA forces, challenges the aforementioned claim that the 
quality and nature of German operations was not already deeply changing.326 
To the contrary, the mandate in 2010 shed light on the change in the quality and 
nature of Bundeswehr operations. First, the mandate included the protection of the local 
population as part of the Bundeswehr mission.327 Second, the military tasks of military 
training and equipment support, stabilization, security, protection, and evacuation were 
322 Bundesregierung, “ISAF,” Drs. 16/10473, 6. 
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mentioned in first and second position in the task ranking.328 Third, the force cap was 
increased by 850 to a total of 5,350 German soldiers to adjust to the new “focus of the 
Bundeswehr mandate to protection and training functions.”329 In other words, infantry 
maneuvering forces eclipsed PRT forces. These so-termed Ausbildungs- und 
Schutzbataillone (ASB, training and protection battalions) were stationed in Kunduz and 
Mazar-e-Sharif, replaced the QRF and counted around 1,400 soldiers, consisting of two 
infantry companies, one engineer company, and one reconnaissance company.330  
In addition, the ASB had access to the fire support of the three armored-howitzers 
stationed in Kunduz. At the tactical level, the new focus on the Bundeswehr mandate to 
protection and training functions meant offensive and active engagement in combat 
operations to immediately oppose a further deterioration of the security situation, and to 
shape, clear, hold, and build331 districts that had been dominated by insurgents.332 In 
contrast to former military presence, German forces conducted overnight operations, had 
328 Antrag der Bundesregierung, “Fortsetzung der Beteiligung bewaffneter deutscher Streitkräfte an 
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close contact with the Afghan people, and conducted attacks on insurgents.333 Thereby, 
German forces attempted to tackle the center of gravity of an insurgency following the 
key COIN tactic: isolate the insurgent from the populace.334  
Two different offensive operations highlighted the adapted German military 
course of actions in the RC North: Operation Harekate Yolo in 2007 and Operation 
Halmazag in 2010. The former was the first offensive combined operation in the RC 
North conducted by several coalition partners (Germany, the United States, Norway, 
Latvia, Spain, Hungary) and ANA forces.335 For the first time, the Bundeswehr 
supported a direct offensive and coordinated operation against insurgents, which was led 
by the German commander of the RC North.336  
This operation must be understood as the first offensive military engagement 
under German command since World War II. Confronting the deteriorating security 
situation in the RC North, the objective of Harekate Yolo was to suppress spreading 
insurgencies, to put an end to insurgent-dominated districts, and to re-establish ISAF and 
Afghan rule in the AOR.337 Next to the more than 500 ISAF soldiers, the Afghan forces 
had the largest contribution in the operation with up to 900 soldiers, giving the insurgent 
sweep an “Afghan face.”338 The German military took part with about 200 soldiers and 
mainly supported with logistics, combat support services, radio communications, medical 
support, and paramedics.339 Harekate Yolo successfully ended after several weeks 
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without ISAF losses and re-established ISAF and Afghan rule in the former insurgent-
occupied areas. Although the Parliamentary State Secretary of Defense once again 
refused a “fundamentally new quality of the ISAF operation” three months later in front 
of the Bundestag, the German-led operation paved the way for a significant German 
military adaptation toward operational necessities in the RC North.340 As Dr. Timo 
Noetzel and Dr. Benjamin Schreer argued, “counterinsurgency has now become the 
major operational focus even for German forces. Up until this operation [Harekate Yolo], 
ISAF had concentrated on patrols aimed at gathering intelligence and contributing to the 
security of ISAF’s bases in the North. Now, the emphasis will increasingly be on 
offensive operations against insurgents, together with Afghan security forces. This is 
necessary to fulfill the task of supporting the Afghan central government as well as to 
protect the local population and ISAF troops.”341 
The later operation in 2010, Halmazag, deviated from the operation Harekate 
Yolo in terms of use of force and German military adaptations to the thriving insurgency 
in the RC North. About 300 German ASB soldiers together with 120 U.S. forces, 
Belgian, and Afghan security forces (ANA and ANP) took over key terrain in the 
insurgents’ stronghold Chara Darreh district to improve the security situation and the 
protection of the population in the vicinity of Kunduz.342 The operation’s objective was 
to secure a permanent presence of ISAF forces in key terrain, to clear the area district-by-
district from insurgents, to hold the seized terrain with increased presence of Afghan 
security forces, to establish a combat outpost––following the new ISAF concept of the 
Bundeswehr––that controlled the immediate vicinity of insurgencies in the Southern 
Chara Darreh district, and to enforce the freedom of action for ISAF and Afghan security 
340 Deutscher Bundestag, “Schriftliche Fragen mit den in der Woche vom 25. Februar 2008 
eingegangenen Antworten der Bundesregierung,” Drs.16/8311 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 2008), accessed on March 26, 2014, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/083 
/1608311.pdf, 34.  
341 Noetzel and Schreer, “German Army and Counterinsurgency,” 3. 
342 Marco Seliger, “Bundeswehr: Der Sieg bei Isa Khel,” Franfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, updated on 
November 15, 2010, http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/ausland/bundeswehr-der-sieg-bei-isa-khel-
11065997.html; Winfried Nachtwei, “Genauer Hinsehen: Sicherheitsvorfälle AFG-Nord Aug. 2010–
Anfang Mai 2011,” accessed on March 26, 2014, http://nachtwei.de/downloads/bericht/SicherhVorf-
NORD-4-11.pdf, 10. 
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forces overall.343 For several days, Bundeswehr infantry forces among their allies were 
involved in high-intensity warfare, including extensive close air support from armored-
howitzers, combat helicopters, and fighter jets.344 A senior German officer reflected on 
the operation and said: “We have taken actions against the Taliban, not them against us as 
it always was in the past.”345 Despite deaths on both sides, NATO and the German 
government claimed success for the operation Halmazag that had achieved the desired 
end: clearing the AOR from insurgents.346  
Bundeswehr forces conducted and commanded their first full-fledged offensive 
operation that did not go unnoticed in either Kabul or Brussels (NATO headquarters); 
citing a senior NATO officer: “The Bundeswehr task forces do a good job [ … ] when 
Berlin permits it.”347 The German forces proved their military capabilities, and as 
Anthony King argues, they “understood the fire-fight in professional terms. They had 
executed the drills they had learnt in training and not only did this ensure their survival 
during this fight, but it was to become established at the basis of the unity for the rest of 
their deployment.”348 
Finally, initial German caveats had permitted the use of kinetic force in 
immediate self-defense only, and less than two years later––while the Afghan conflict 
had already lasted for eight years––the German military compelled enemies to fulfill their 
will by using kinetic force against any personnel who planned, prepared, supported, 
343 Deutscher Bundestag, “Unterrichtung durch die Bundesregierung: Fortschrittsbericht der 
Bundesregierung zur Lage in Afghanistan 2010,” Drs. 17/4250 (Berlin: Bundesanzeiger 
Verlagsgesellschaft, 2010), accessed on March 26, 2014, http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/17/042 
/1704250.pdf, 23; Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 13; Matthias Gebauer, “Krieg in Kunduz: Taliban 
attackieren neuen deutschen Außenposten,” Spiegel, updated on November 4, 2010, http://www.spiegel 
.de/politik/deutschland/krieg-in-kunduz-taliban-attackieren-neuen-deutschen-aussenposten-a-727096.html. 
344 Gebauer, “Krieg in Kunduz”; Nachtwei, “Genauer Hinsehen,” 10. 
345 Seliger, “Der Sieg bei Isa Khel.” 
346 Thomas Wiegold, “RC N Watch: Anschlag auf den Bürgermeister von Kundus, Bundeswehr sieht 
Erfolg in Char Darrah,” Augengeradeaus, updated on November 16, 2010, http://augengeradeaus.net/2010 
/11/rc-n-watch-anschlag-auf-den-burgermeister-von-kundus-bundeswehr-sieht-erfolg-in-char-darrah/. 
347 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 13; Seliger, “Der Sieg bei Isa Khel.” 
348 Anthony King, The Combat Soldier: Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-
First Centuries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 304. 
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escaped attacks, or who exhibited other forms of hostile behavior toward German 
soldiers.349 
D. CONCLUSION: MILES BELLICUS IN ARMED CONFLICT OR WAR 
Since the decline of the general security situation, the gradual political adaptation 
faced formerly unknown military dynamics and escalating bottom-up pressure and the 
military adaptation was confronted with alarming deficits and uncertainties at the 
operational and tactical level. Both adaptations shed light on the Bundeswehr’s learning 
progress and experience during the Afghan armed conflict. Thomas Rid and Martin Zapfe 
hit the mark by arguing that the conglomerate of “more centralized ISAF-control, more 
allied forces in the North, and more enemy pressure” affected Berlin’s politics that—
since the first German soldiers set foot on Afghan ground—progressively altered 
Germany’s willingness to use force abroad.350  
Beyond the shadow of a doubt, personnel with their experiences are the core of an 
organization and animate the organization’s effectiveness and survival. Regardless of any 
new Bundeswehr structure or doctrine, the Einsatz-Generation (operationally-
experienced generation of German soldiers) will deeply affect the Bundeswehr’s 
corporate culture and identity.351 In the end, an organization’s personnel socializes with 
the surrounding environment, and the Einsatz-Generation’s experience will spillover and 
have a lasting impact on the Bundeswehr and on less experienced soldiers––if superior 
officers and also Berlin permit it.  
Due to the Afghanistan mission, the Einsatz-Generation is able to differentiate 
between the nature and the concurrence of PRT and maneuvering forces. Due to political 
and military dynamics, the German ISAF initial emphasis on reconstruction tasks shifted 
toward protection of the Afghan people to include COIN tactics. Indeed, both approaches 
to improve the security situation of the Afghan people and to enforce Afghan rule could 
349 Auerswald and Saidemann, NATO in Afghanistan, 151; Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 12. 
350 Rid and Zapfe, “Mission Command without Mission,” 206‒7. 
351 Ibid., 214‒5; Ernst-Christoph Meier, “Vorwort,” in Der Einsatz der Bundeswehr in Afghanistan: 
Sozial- und politikwissenschaftliche Perspektiven ed. Anja Seiffert, Phil C. Langer and Carsten Pietsch 
(Wiesbaden: Springer VS Verlag, 2012), 7. 
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not be isolated from one another. While senior military officers rejected partnering with 
the Afghan security forces in the beginning of the conflict, they embraced those 
partnerships (e.g., OMLT) in the worsening situation in the RC North and, further, 
pointed at the importance of combat capabilities for mission success.352 As the former 
Inspector of the Army argued in 2010,  
I think the insight that the ability to fight must be the decisive feature of 
all Army soldiers—including those deployed in stabilization operations—
has now been generally accepted. [ … ] Plainly stated, as soldiers, our 
unique feature is the ability to fight. [ … ] And when you analyze how the 
company commander of the QRF or of a Task Force company operates  
[ … ] then this is exactly what the Panzer forces have been practicing for 
decades, previously under the term “battle of combined arms” and now 
under the term “operation of joint forces.”353  
Other German generals concluded that Bundeswehr soldiers had finally arrived at 
the “cutting-edge of their profession … to be able to fight and, if required, to be willing 
to fight.”354 Following this logic, some German soldiers distanced themselves from the 
principles of Innere Führung because they perceived its relevance as being part of a 
military metaphysical approach that suited the normality but not real cases of operations 
abroad.355 The application of Innere Führung seemed to be disconnected from the 
battlefield that revealed old traditionalist postures, claiming that “Innere Führung made 
neither good citizens nor good soldiers.”356 These debates on and operational experiences 
of military virtuosity and bravery––typical since the existence of military professionalism 
and also thriving during the Great Wars in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries––
supported long-standing traditionalist thoughts and fueled the emergence of a miles 
bellicus concept, which was assumed to be the pure form of soldiering for contemporary 
operations of joint forces.357 
352 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 27. 
353 Ibid. 
354 Ibid., 26‒8. 
355 Hans-Georg Ehrhart, “Innere Führung und der Wandel des Kriegsbildes,” Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte 48 (2009): 29; Wiesendahl, “Zurück zum Krieger?” 249. 
356 King, Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces, 194. 
357 King, Combat Soldier, 304; Wiesendahl, “Zurück zum Krieger? “ 245‒8. 
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According to Elmar Wiesendahl, the miles bellicus concept is based on the 
struggle of armed violence in battle alone in which the enemy is crushed by superiority of 
arms, personnel, morality, and conduct of operations.358 Thereby, miles bellicus provides 
neither insight into military tasks in the transition from war to peace nor military tasks 
during peacetime to prevent a new spiral of violence.359 Additionally, miles bellicus 
comprehends the use of force (i.e., military violence) as the only means to confront 
enemies and insurgents.360 Particularly in MOOTW, the miles bellicus is pushed beyond 
its capabilities because it neglects any functional extensions. Furthermore, the one-sided 
approach is not in accord with COIN principles in which protection of the people, trust 
building with the local populace, and isolation of the insurgents from the society are key 
factors. Bluntly, if there is no war, miles bellicus has no job and thus loses its usefulness. 
Miles bellicus is based on soldierly values and virtues; it lacks democratic and social 
values.361 As Elmar Wiesendahl argued, miles bellicus and miles protector will never be 
on the same sheet of paper.362 Thus, the miles bellicus concept omits key aspects of 
modern military professionalism, most notably the ability to give and to receive trust.  
While Innere Führung was adapted in 2008 to meet modern operational demands, 
it distances itself from any ideas that could be linked to miles bellicus thoughts solely. It 
expressly mentions the importance of different roles, which require different capabilities, 
including ethical, political, cultural, social, and military competencies.363 Thereby, 
Innere Führung is interestingly the only German Joint Service Regulation that 
emphasizes trust and puts this term and its meaning at the center of military 
professionalism.364 Trust must be understood as the “firm belief in the reliability, truth, 
ability, or strength of someone or something;” it leaves no doubt about a twofold 
358 Wiesendahl, “Zurück zum Krieger? “ 245. 
359 Ibid. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Ibid., 246. 
362 Ibid. 
363 Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Innere Führung, Nr. 507. 
364 Trust is more often explained and mentioned than comradeship and discipline in the context of 
German military professionalism; Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, Innere Führung.  
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direction.365 To be specific, German soldiers had to trust Berlin’s approach toward the 
Afghanistan armed conflict which progressively changed over time, and Berlin had to 
trust its deployed soldiers and give them the freedom they required in terms of German 
military professionalism to have a successful mission. A twofold relationship was 
sporadically met on both sides and had to develop and thrive against the background of 
military and political adaptation during the Afghanistan conflict. 
  
365 Erin McKean, New Oxford American Dictionary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
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VI. THE EVOLUTION OF THE BUNDESWEHR TO 
OPERATIONAL FORCES 
Dem deutschen Volke.366 
    –Inscription on the Reichstag 
 
Wir.Dienen.Deutschland.367 
    –Slogan of the Bundeswehr 
 
Since its establishment in 1955, the Bundeswehr has taken a special place in 
modern German history, politics, and society. Before 1990, the German military trained 
to fight a war “which never broke out and whose nature was different to current 
operations.”368 While other European powers deployed their troops worldwide, the 
Bundeswehr focused on forward defense and gradually became acquainted with foreign 
missions, which confronted the German public and its soldiers with heretofore unknown 
social, political, and military dynamics.369 With the peaceful end of the Cold War, the 
Bundeswehr adapted to the nature of current operations, while the call for German 
soldiers increased and intensified on a global level in terms of mission quantity and 
quality.  
Against the background of Germany’s self-image as a civil power and its 
proclivity to favor civil and political approaches over military interventionism, few 
politicians and military experts viewed with pleasure the evolution of the Bundeswehr to 
operational forces. In 1994, this evolution gradually emerged with quantitatively and 
qualitatively intensifying out-of-area missions, requiring new tasks of the Bundeswehr 
beyond national defense. To be sure, the Ministry of Defense has always emphasized the 
366 The inscription on the front of the Reichstag building with the dedication: To the German people. 
367 The central campaign and slogan of the Bundeswehr picks up the commitment: “We. Serve. 
Germany;” Bundesministerium der Verteidigung, “Bundeswehr: Wir.Dienen.Deutschland.,” accessed on 
April 18, 2014, http://wirdienendeutschland.de/selbstverstaendnis.html. 
368 King, Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces, 192. 
369 Ibid. 
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defensive character of the armed forces and has left no doubt that “the military, with its 
special capabilities, plays an important but not exclusive role” and is “only to be 
employed where civilian means are unsuitable, unavailable or unsuccessful.” Still, 
German society rightly questioned any further deployment of German soldiers as a tool to 
engage in foreign politics and to solve international conflicts. Thus, debates thrived in the 
medial realm, and thus, the German public became increasingly skeptical and opposed to 
Bundeswehr deployments.370 As Ulrike Esther Franke argued, “[S]kepticism vis-à-vis 
military force and its use as a foreign policy instrument has been an essential axiom of 
German foreign policy since 1945.”371  
Certainly, it is not only Germany’s historical guilt and its terrible experiences of 
more than a decade of war on German soil but there is also another reason that prevails as 
to why the Germans do not happily talk about war: Today, Germany is a peaceful country 
and the German people live in safety. Armed conflict has been far from German territory; 
military equipment and weapons in particular, to say nothing of death and wounded 
soldiers, are not an immediate part of German life. At the same time, Germany uses its 
forces abroad to project the nation’s interest. The decision on the use of military force is 
taken in a legitimate and democratically controlled way. Bundeswehr deployments are 
generally based on a UN mandate in accordance with international law, but they also are 
based on the German constitution and thus on the Bundestag and on the will of the 
German populace.  
Moreover, the legitimate use of German soldiers relies on the German spirit of 
ideals of command and leadership—Innere Führung—that puts sense of trust, 
responsibility, and respect for other people, cultures, politics, ethnicities, and societies in 
German military professionalism. On this broad basis, Germany contributes in its own 
military understanding to peace and stability. Admittedly, Germany’s self-image of a 
civil power has developed for good reasons; shaping the future of the international 
370 Federal Ministry of Defense, The Bundeswehr on Operations: Publication to Mark the 15th 
Anniversary of the First Parliamentary Mandate for Armed Bundeswehr Missions Abroad (Berlin: Federal 
Ministry of Defense, 2009), 48. 
371 Ulrike Esther Franke, “A Tale of Stumbling Blocks and Road Bumps: Germany’s (non-) 
Revolution in Military Affairs,” Comparative Strategy 31, no. 4 (2012): 363. 
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system, however, demands living up to a nation’s responsibility. As the Minister of 
Defense Dr. Ursula von der Leyen argued in 2014, “we [Germans] cannot turn away 
when murder and rape happen on a daily basis.”372 Thus, one must say that the use of 
soldiers is considered to be a tool to enforce the state monopoly on the use of violence 
and to safeguard rule of law where foreign regimes are not capable or not willing to do 
so. Ergo, the use of soldiers is an instrument for peace and stability that is employed to 
stand between the German political and social comprehension and awareness of good and 
evil.  
This political and social perception generates controversies in the public realm. 
Hence, these sociopolitical dynamics formulate a decisive interest “to the German 
people” that serves as the foundation of any German military interventionism. In 
considering recent statements of Minister of Defense Dr. von der Leyen and the 
Bundeswehr missions in general, as well as the Afghanistan mission in particular, 
German politics and the military have not only become more self-confident and 
courageous but also more experienced and thus deliberative about projecting the nation’s 
interest with military means.373 More specifically, while German soldiers had to trust 
Berlin’s approach to the Afghanistan mission that progressively changed over time, 
Berlin also had to trust its deployed soldiers and give them the necessary freedom of 
action in terms of German military professionalism. This relationship of trust largely 
developed and thrived against the background of the military and political adaptations 
during the Afghanistan war.  
372 The quote in the German language: “Wir können nicht zur Seite schauen, wenn Mord und 
Vergewaltigung an der Tagesordnung sind, schon allein aus humanitären Gründen,” “Militärpolitik: Von 
der Leyen will Bundeswehr verstärkt im Ausland einsetzen,” Spiegel, updated on January 26, 2014, http:// 
www.spiegel.de/politik /deutschland/von-der-leyen-fuer-staerkeres-engagement-der-bundeswehr-im-
ausland-a-945568.html. 
373 Ulrike Scheffer and Albrecht Meier, “Verteidigungsministerin setzt auf mehr Auslandseinsätze,” 
Der Tagesspiegel, updated on January 27, 2014, http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/bundeswehr-
verteidigungs ministerin-setzt-auf-mehr-auslandseinsaetze/9386838.html; “Von der Leyen hält Bundeswehr 
nicht für überlastet,” Zeit, updated on February 6, 2014, http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland /2014-
02/bundeswehr-von-der-leyen-mali-senegal; “Von der Leyen will Auslandseinsätze hochfahren,” Die Welt, 
updated on January 26, 2014, http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article124233207 /Von-der-Leyen-
will-Auslandseinsaetze-hochfahren.html. 
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The critical turning point came in 2009 when German politicians started to talk 
about “war” and the media presented Germany’s soldiers not as “aid workers in uniform” 
but associated them with long-time forgotten and unknown images of firing howitzers, 
moving in MICV under hostile fire, participating in coordinated CAS and high-intensity 
combat operations. These images confronted the German public with the ugly side of 
military interventionism. Hence, the Afghanistan conflict extended the German political 
and social comprehension and awareness of good and evil because for the first time in 
German history, the German government not only spoke of war but also deployed 
soldiers to fight a war in Afghanistan. These changes of the use of German soldiers had 
more qualitative impacts on the German armed forces than the 20 years since unification 
and perhaps before. These political, social, and military changes created the Einsatz-
Generation that will surely have a significant effect well after the Germans cease security 
and combat operations in Afghanistan in 2014. 
This military adaptation in the past decade illustrated a change of thinking of 
German military professionalism that resulted in the emergence of a new identity for the 
Bundeswehr from within. Moreover, it sheds light on the role of soldiers as miles 
protector and bellicus. In considering military professionalism, analog interpretations 
were revitalized from the past with the different perspectives of Baudissin and Karst. On 
one side, Baudissin regarded the military organization as a kind of democratic school of 
the republic that had to teach its citizens to stand up for the West German state and its 
society. Karst claimed that teaching the society could not be the key role for a military 
organization. He pointed out that society must generate the social and political process 
from within to stand up for the German state and its interests. As such, he was convinced 
that Innere Führung was founded on an understanding of society that was too ideal.  
The Afghanistan conflict, however, showed that debates in society and in the 
Bundestag on the use of violence and deployments abroad changed significantly and, 
hence, the German people critically questioned the foreign policy of projecting national 
interests with military means. With respect to Baudissin, the Bundeswehr increasingly 
possesses a crucial political and social component because the soldiers are equal 
members of the society who engage in political and social debates that are closely 
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monitored by other institutions (i.e., media, defense committee) and members of the 
society. Thus, the integration of soldiers in society does not translate to more––or more 
prominent––soldiers in and around government or society in Germany. It does, however, 
have a decisive impact on sociopolitical dynamics. The resolute readiness and willingness 
to defend the German people is one vital part of military professionalism, but it does not 
provide the whole story of the armed forces in a democracy. 
Almost 14 years of military service in Afghanistan significantly determined the 
evolution of the Bundeswehr to operational forces. The involvement in Afghanistan 
started with a twofold and controversial design of opposing missions (OEF and ISAF) 
that was initiated by Chancellor Schröder’s threat to break up the coalition and the 
demand to follow his lead. The coalition’s will to stay in power outweighed aspects of 
German soldiers’ tasks that had an unforeseen scope: peacekeeping in the beginning and 
fighting in a war far from national territory in the end. While Berlin’s initial decision––
following the logic of a top-down procedure––assigned no merit to fighting and set strict 
directives to promote a publicly acceptable peacekeeping image by avoiding any 
escalation and any German military involvement in armed conflicts, it caused the military 
dynamics in the RC North to increase in complexity and consequently intensified 
political supervision.  
Berlin’s political and operational micromanagement called the principles of 
Innere Führung into question and challenged German military professionalism, which 
tested soldiers in the field and confronted the culture of the Bundeswehr with formerly 
unknown and unexpected operational demands. Mastery of the complexity of twenty-first 
century armed conflicts was achieved by embodying a broad set of skills and knowledge. 
This circumstance forced a military adaptation at the strategic, operational, and tactical 
level that slowly changed Berlin’s perception of soldiering in complex conflicts. After 
2009, Germany’s strategy changed and a shift from focusing on helper and mediator tasks 
to protector and fighter profiles emerged, bringing a new Einsatz-Generation to the fore. 
This Einsatz-Generation will deeply affect the Bundeswehr’s corporate culture and 
identity because they possess operational experiences and can differentiate between the 
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nature of complex conflicts and the concurrence of helper, mediator, protector, and 
fighter profiles.  
With the Afghanistan conflict, the Bundeswehr was confronted with the cutting 
edge of the military profession that extends from actors who help and mediate to those 
who protect and fight. To be successful means to acquire different capabilities that rely 
on ethical, political, cultural, social, and militarily competences. Beyond the shadow of a 
doubt, uneducated soldiers neither rely on these overarching competences nor know that 
they are instruments of peace and stability. They drag down a military organization, 
which becomes a means for warfare purposes solely. 
The thesis argues that the evolution of the Bundeswehr to operational forces was a 
dynamic sociopolitical and military process that was determined by the concurrence of 
top-down and bottom-up factors, which were largely affected by the operational and 
tactical course of events of the German mission in Afghanistan. Thus, German politics 
and military at different levels, ranging from the strategic to the tactical level, had a 
significant impact on military adaptation that created operational forces and broadened 
the political and social understanding of the use of German military abroad. In addition to 
Dirk Steinhoff’s claim that “German military transformation374 [ … ] is informed by 
driving forces and limiting factors on the international level, as well as the domestic 
level,” one must see the root of the change from within the heart and mind of the army 
itself as due to altered military missions.375 Military missions beyond European borders 
transformed the German military that had implications on the political level as it concerns 
foreign and security policy as well as the role of the forces in society. Top-down aspects 
(i.e., a collection of security policy statements and proclamations of ministers and chiefs 
of defense) and bottom-up aspects (i.e., changes in thinking about the spirit and service of 
the German military professionalism in the stress of conflict and domestic politics and 
political culture) illustrate the adaptation to a new set of political, social, cultural, and 
374 The term transformation is defined in the German Defense White Paper 2006 that reads, 
“Transformation is the proactive shaping of a continuous process of adaptation to the ever-changing 
framework conditions with the aim of enhancing the Bundeswehr’s operational effectiveness,” Federal 
Ministry of Defense, White Paper 2006, 75. 
375 Steinhoff, “Determinants and politics of German military transformation,” v. 
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operational demands and clarify the extent of the changes of the German military 
professionalism.  
In considering the German ISAF and OEF case, the initial dual military design, 
the defensive risk minimization, the paradoxical demands, and the thinking about ideals 
of command and leadership of the German military were the challenges to operational 
German forces. While the complexity of the ISAF mission increased and included fast-
changing tasks that required humanitarian helpers as well as political and social 
mediators, the deteriorating general security situation required protectors and fighters.  
Consequently, some soldiers and politicians put the arrival of the German military 
at the “cutting-edge of their profession … to be able to fight and, if required, to be willing 
to fight”376 on the same level with the soldiers’ role as a miles bellicus. Debates on the 
different roles of soldiers, including the necessity and meaning of armed forces in a 
democracy, were already known from the Karst-Baudissin controversy on German 
military professionalism. As Rudolf Hamann stated, rethinking Innere Führung means 
having to address the evolution of the Bundeswehr from a forward defense force to an 
operational force.377 The clear statement of the German Federal President, Joachim 
Gauck, in front of the Reichstag during a ceremonial oath of the Bundeswehr, “to be a 
soldier means going where the Bundestag sends you,” underlines what it means to 
possess operational forces in a democratic nation.378 Thus, the evolution of the 
Bundeswehr to operational forces relies on its loyal servants—soldiers—and on their will 
to adapt to contemporary social, political, and operational demands. Rightly, the German 
White Paper 2006 argues that “the Bundeswehr’s transformation process cannot succeed 
unless there is a lasting willingness for change.”379 In particular, the Einsatz-Generation 
376 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 26‒8. 
377 Rudolf Hamann, “Im Gleichschritt in die Sackgasse,” in Auslandseinsätze der Bundeswehr: 
Sozialwissenschaftliche Analysen, Diagnosen und Perspektiven, ed. Sabine Jaberg, Heiko Biehl, Günter 
Mohrmann and Maren Tomforde (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2009), 68. 
378 Joachim Gauck, “Bundespräsident Joachim Gauck beim feierlichen Gelöbnis für Soldatinnen und 
Soldaten der Bundeswehr am 20. Juli 2013,” Bundespräsidialamt, accessed on April 18, 2014, 
http://www.bundespraesident.de/SharedDocs /Downloads/DE/Reden/2013/07/130720-Geloebnis-
Bundeswehr.pdf?__blob=publicationFile. 
379 Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 2006, 75. 
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will contribute to this willingness for change and will certainly have an impact on the 
evolution of the Bundeswehr. 
The Einsatz-Generation, however, challenges the evolution of the Bundeswehr in 
different ways, mainly by confronting comrades who feel alienated or not part of the 
Bundeswehr as operational forces.380 First, one has to take soldiers of another generation 
into account, those who joined the forces before the conduct of out-of-area missions and, 
surely, pledged allegiance to Germany under the premise of forward defense forces 
during the Cold War.381 Those comrades probably find themselves in a role conflict 
confronted with the changes of the Bundeswehr, which has not only various objectives in 
terms of quantity and quality but also in the conduct of military operations—war—
without geographical restrictions.382  
Although the well-known understanding that officers train their troops in peace 
and command them in war remains valid, the complexity of military interventions 
requires military professionalism that is founded on both military expertise and 
knowledge of political, humanitarian, economic, and cultural aspects incorporating a 
diversity of soldiers’ roles as combatants, helpers, protectors and mediators.383 The 
reasonable and opportune fusion of these roles, going far beyond pure military needs, 
implies arriving at the cutting-edge of the military profession. Therefore, the Bundeswehr 
mission in Afghanistan has been unique for both the German populace and military 
because German soldiers were confronted with this fusion, ranging from deliberate, 
analytical, and action-taking capabilities and willingness in general, to facing the reality 
of wounded and killed soldiers for the first time in German history.384  
380 Maren Tomforde, “‘Einmal muss man schon dabei gewesen sein …’ – Auslandseinsätze als 
Initiation in die ‘neue’ Bundeswehr,” in Armee in der Demokratie: Zum Verhältnis von zivilen und 
militärischen Prinzipien, ed. Ulrich vom Hagen (Wiesbaden: Springer VS Verlag, 2006), 103–5. 
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In a nutshell, more than a decade of peacekeeping and fighting in Afghanistan 
transformed the Bundeswehr toward operational forces, and as Thomas Rid and Martin 
Zapfe argued, “in the early 2010s it is hard to find a non-commissioned or commissioned 
officer up to the rank of brigadier general who has not served in Kabul, Mazar-e Sharif, 
Kunduz, or Feyzabad.”385 In other words, German ISAF soldiers who were formerly 
portrayed as “aid workers in uniform” were transformed into operational soldiers, who 
conduct MOOTW, including high-intensity warfare missions, and who are able and 
willing to fight.386 As General Harald Kujat highlighted, the Bundeswehr mission in 
Afghanistan created an Einsatz-Generation “with personal combat experience, 
contributing to a ‘more self-confident’ Bundeswehr.”387 Additionally, President Gauck 
picked up this perception of self-confidence and extended the concept of citizen in 
uniform, calling the soldiers “Mutbürger in Uniform” (brave-citizens in uniform) because 
only their profession demands risking life and limb, killing other humans, and enduring 
the death of comrades.388  
Next to the argument of the emergence of a new Bundeswehr that creates 
conflicting roles, non-deployed soldiers might feel alienated from the Bundeswehr 
because the military missions define mission-experienced soldiers against others. As 
modern armed forces abolish the mass military model, the armed forces are reduced in 
size and that results in internally different social dynamics and a new a corporate identity, 
385 Rid and Zapfe, “German Military Adaptation in Afghanistan,” 214‒5. 
386 Sangar, “Weight of the Past(s),” 7; Steinhoff, “Determinants and politics of German military 
transformation,” 126‒7; Angelika Dörfler-Dierken, Gerhard Kümmel, “Soldat-Sein heute: Eine 
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especially when missions generate a cohesion effect.389 Consequently, the Einsatz-
Generation forms a two-class military differentiation between mission-experienced and 
non-experienced soldiers automatically.390 As Maren Tomforde argued, “you [soldiers] 
have to have been there [the mission] at least once, otherwise you can’t really talk, when 
your comrades discuss operations. And operations get talked about a lot.”391 Also, 
Anthony King concludes, “foreign missions are creating a mission oriented military 
identity which deployed soldiers understand as an important transition from the ‘classic’ 
trained soldier to a deployable trooper in a newly structured Bundeswehr. In other words, 
operational experiences have had a collective effect and have contributed to a new self-
understanding in the direction of deployable military professionals.”392  
This professionalization from the “‘classic’ trained soldier to a deployable 
trooper”393 is not only visible to other comrades but also acknowledged by Foreign Duty 
Medals as a national decoration awarded during military ceremonies. First awarded in 
1996 for the deployment to the Balkans (IFOR), the number of different Foreign Duty 
Medals has increased with each foreign mission.394 On one side, the award is a defining 
symbol of mission-experienced soldiers, and thus, it defines them against others.395 On 
the other side, it is the official recognition of their service—acknowledging their 
participation in humanitarian, peacekeeping, and fighting missions in foreign countries—
on behalf of the German people. Next to the Bundeswehr Cross of Honor, which was first 
introduced in 1980, other national decorations and medals were created at the peak of 
389 In considering Anthony King’s argumentations, cohesion effect means, “professional European 
soldiers may be increasingly extending comradeship to those who can perform their drills properly. [ … ] 
Cohesion is becoming a function of professional practice, not so much a prior condition of it as it seems to 
have been in the mass conscript armies of the twentieth century,” King, Transformation of Europe’s Armed 
Forces, 235‒6. 
390 Heiko Biehl and Jörg Keller, “Hohe Identifikation und nüchterner Blick,” in Auslandseinsätze der 
Bundeswehr: Sozialwissenschaftliche Analysen, Diagnosen und Perspektiven, ed. Sabine Jaberg, Heiko 
Biehl, Günter Mohrmann and Maren Tomforde (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 2009), 135. 
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Germany’s engagement and participation in high-intensity military operations in 2008 
and 2010: the Bundeswehr Cross of Honor for Valor and the Einsatzmedaille Gefecht 
(Medal of Combat Action). The former was first awarded for an act of bravery “in the 
face of the enemy” by German ISAF soldiers, who were fighting side by side with U.S. 
forces against Taliban camps and clearing the area from hostile forces in the end.396 The 
latter was introduced to award soldiers, who “at least once actively participated in combat 
operations or suffered terrorist or military violence under high personal risk.”397 In 
particular, the introduction of the Einsatzmedaille Gefecht is a matter of controversy 
among historians, politicians, and military experts who fear a militarization of the 
German politics and an emergence of a new heroic identity of the Bundeswehr that would 
be disconnected from German military traditions and Innere Führung.398 In a nutshell, 
the importance of symbols––medals and decorations––is essential for creating cohesion 
and an identity. More specifically, it is also proof of military professionalism. 
Today, the Bundeswehr relies on soldiers with a diversity of experience and 
capabilities. Some soldiers are basic-trained, others are mission-experienced, and a few 
are “specialists in violence;” however, they all have in common that they are part of the 
German society and not isolated within the military realm.399 As an equal member of the 
society, the brave citizens in uniform embody the political, social, and military values of 
the German populace and thus carry their experience and sociopolitical conflicts into the 
society. The evolution of the Bundeswehr into an operational force was a result of the 
different phases of the Afghanistan mission and Innere Führung with its adaptation, 
which was a successful balancing act to harmonize the fundamentals of German military 
professionalism with the integration of the German military in the society.  
396 Rid and Zapfe, “German Military Adaptation in Afghanistan,” 207‒8; King, “Adaptation or 
Refusal to Adapt,” 102. 
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(Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2007), 139. 
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Although Germany was conducting war in Afghanistan, the importance of 
capabilities––which go beyond the use of violence––and their necessity to guarantee 
mission success was evident, giving de-escalation and peace a real chance. Importantly, 
Innere Führung neither defines the center of gravity nor strategic or tactical objectives to 
guarantee mission success. Rather, it provides the political, social, and military spirit and 
ideals to fulfill current and future Bundeswehr missions. While the new operational 
forces with a new Einsatz-Generation developed, Innere Führung not only “proved its 
worth on operations” but especially held the armed forces like a clamp together.400 In the 
end, the Afghanistan mission has enhanced German military professionalism of the 
personnel and the military organization, deepened the civil-military identity and 
integration of the Bundeswehr in the society, and also promoted Germany’s credibility 
with its developed operational forces as a reliable ally within the international system. 
This military is able and––when necessary––willing to fight on behalf of Germany.  
The critical question is what sort of role will be assigned to the Bundeswehr in the 
years ahead. The current campaign of the Bundeswehr provides an idea what German 
people have to expect in terms of German military professionalism. The notion of 
“Wir.Dienen.Deutschland.” (We.Serve.Germany.) expresses three key aspects in terms of 
the role and ideals of the Bundeswehr. First, the emphasis on “we” leaves no doubt that 
the German military is not only deeply integrated in the German society but also 
underlines the importance that German soldiers are equal members of the society with the 
same political and social values of the German populace.401 Second, serving—including 
to risk life and limb in the extreme—to guarantee Germany’s freedom and security 
remains the core ideal of the identity of the Bundeswehr.402 Third, the emphasis on 
Germany, home of Germans, which is a free, safe, and an internationally respected 
400 Federal Ministry of Defense, White Paper 2006, 60. 
401 Thomas de Maizière, “Wir. Dienen. Deutschland. – Das Selbstverständnis der Bundeswehr,” 






                                                 
partner and friend, and also pride to protect German values and interests.403 A triad that 
goes hand-in-hand with ideals of Innere Führung and, in particular, with the inscription 
on the Reichstag: Dem deutschen Volke!  
403 Thomas de Maizière, “Wir. Dienen. Deutschland. – Das Selbstverständnis der Bundeswehr,” 
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